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Florida Expressways and the Public Works Career of Congressman William C. Cramer
Justin C. Whitney
ABSTRACT

Since the introduction of automobiles to Florida in the 1900s, highways have been
integral to the state’s economy. In the 1950s, statewide limited-access highway projects
were introduced in the form of a state-operated turnpike and the national Interstate
highway system. This paper traces the simultaneous development of both expressway
systems, outlining the previous condition of Florida’s highways, the initiatives taken by
Florida’s governors, and especially the role of William C. Cramer of St. Petersburg,
Florida’s first Republican United States Congressman since Reconstruction.
In the House of Representatives, as a ranking member of the Roads Subcommittee
of the Public Works Committee, Cramer played a prominent role in shaping federal
highway policies, addressing corruption in highway politics, keeping Interstates toll-free,
and preventing highway funds from being diverted to other programs. He battled
proponents of the Sunshine State Parkway, which ran parallel to designated Interstate
routes and threatened to make them unfeasible. As the capstone to his public works
career, Cramer secured additional mileage to provide for the ‘missing link’ between
Tampa Bay and Miami, which had not been authorized in the original federal outlays.
The designation extended a route through St. Petersburg.
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Introduction

Three hundred feet below the earth's surface, beneath the border of France and
Switzerland, a miniature Big Bang is taking place. Scientists have created a device with
which they can observe subatomic particles slamming into each other at nearly the speed
of light, in hopes of discovering the nature of these particles, the formations of solar
systems and galaxies, and the creation of the universe. I envy these scientists. Their task
is relatively simple. Across the Atlantic in St. Petersburg, Florida, as a student of the
Florida Studies Program, I observe much more complex phenomena, involving what
happens when people of diverse backgrounds and expansive technological capabilities
come together in a state with a unique environmental makeup, asking, what is Florida's
place in relation to its neighboring regions, the country, the world?
The familiar lament among scholars of Florida is that the state’s culture is too
diverse to be understood. Composed of numerous regions, each culturally distinct and
some in themselves as diverse as a small state, Florida bewilders and amuses scholars
trying to find a common thread. While journalist Michael Paterniti has described Florida
as “the truest melting pot we have,” novelist Carl Hiaasen describes the state as “almost
Toffleresque in its chaos.” Events occur in disjointed, episodic sequences, “as a
television drama unto itself,” wrote Paterniti, “a place where dots do not connect.”1
Meanwhile, Florida has come to be regarded as a bellwether state for the rest of the
1

nation. During the 2008 presidential election, political analysts observed with keen
interest the behavior of voters along the I-4 corridor running from Tampa Bay through
Orlando to Daytona Beach. While voters of this corridor figure out where they stand on
the issues, this booming population may provide indicators of what direction the nation
will take.
What does this mean for the future of Florida and the nation? “To visit a people
who have no history,” wrote historian Richard Hofstadter, “is like going into a wilderness
where there are no roads to direct a traveler. The people have nothing to which they can
look back; the wisdom of their forefathers are forgotten; the experience of one generation
is lost to the succeeding one; and the consequence is, that people have little attachment to
their state, their policy has no system, and their legislature no decided character.”2 My
aim has been to pinpoint some aspect of history that penetrates the complex, nuanced
history of modern Florida and the United States. Throughout the nation, and especially in
Florida, mobility is perhaps the most common American trait. According to Hofstadter,
“the American habit of movement has continued in full force even after the
disappearance of the frontier.” Helpful in understanding American history, declared
Hofstadter, would be a “great imaginative book on American movement.”3
On reading Hofstadter, I found affirmation for my nearly two years of research on
Florida’s highways. When people refuse to stand still long enough to allow for a
thorough study, it seems logical to bring attention to the technology that enables that
movement. In fact, my fascination with American mobility dates back to my childhood.
Some of my earliest memories are of traveling with my family along Interstate 80 from
my hometown of Evanston, on the Southeast border of Wyoming, to the nearby city of
2

Salt Lake City, Utah, counting train engines on the nearby Union Pacific railroad. I also
remember my father waking up early for his drive to nearby mountains, where he labored
as a technician for a petroleum company, while my mother worked as a front desk clerk
in hotels built to accommodate passing travelers from distant places. Next to my grade
school playground was Interstate 80. As I slept, the wail of speeding semis pierced the
silent Wyoming night. In short, I grew up with a pronounced awareness of the prevalence
of motor transportation in American life. In fact, I do not recall ever living more than a
mile or two from an Interstate highway.
By focusing on expressways, I hope to bring attention to an aspect of Florida that
represents a shared experience. Everyone in this state, regardless of background, is
affected in countless ways by car culture. Most able adults have experienced driving a
vehicle, many of them on a daily basis. With roadways, parking spaces, and garages, the
built landscape is dominated by motor vehicles, such that areas designated for
pedestrians, cyclists, and mass transportation are in the margins. As for the cars
themselves, drivers often put a great deal of thought into the kinds of vehicles they drive,
including power, suspension, transmissions, steering, brakes, along with interior comfort,
such as seats, headrests, and air conditioning. Take a glance at any newspaper, and motor
transportation stories are bound to fill a few columns. The stories deal with road rage,
hit-and-runs, changes in driving laws and road conditions, suggestions on how and how
not to drive, car insurance, fuel economy, and the progress of major car companies, to say
nothing of pages upon pages of new and used car sales advertisements.
More specifically, I have brought attention to what I consider to be the most
explosive, defining event in the state’s motor transportation history: the creation of the
3

Interstate and turnpike systems, starting in the latter half of the twentieth century. This
study ties together many major elements of the overall Florida story: interregional
interaction, political transformation, and environmental degradation. My hope is that this
study will be useful in discussing Florida’s impressive transportation systems, how they
came to be, how they shaped the state, and what their future holds in store.
The year 2006 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the National Interstate and
Defense Highways Act of 1956. While President Dwight D. Eisenhower has been
recognized for his leadership, less has been said about the roles of successive Presidents
and members of Congress who saw the Interstate system to its completion. This thesis
focuses on the endeavors of Congressman William C. Cramer of St. Petersburg, Florida,
who in the 1960s was the senior Republican on the Roads Subcommittee of the Public
Works Committee of the House of Representatives.
On the Roads Subcommittee, Cramer championed the Interstate system during the
administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Throughout his career,
Cramer fought the incorporation of toll highways into Interstate routes. He stood out
early in his career in the creation of tougher laws to fight corruption in Interstate
construction; eventually, the Kennedy administration adopted some of his proposals.
While President Johnson promoted Great Society programs and escalated the Vietnam
conflict, Cramer rallied fellow Subcommittee members to prevent Interstate funding from
being diverted to other programs, a struggle that continued into the Nixon presidency.
While helping the Subcommittee broker additional Interstate mileage for the nation,
Cramer secured extra mileage for his home state and district. Thanks largely to Cramer,
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Florida gained an Interstate route linking Tampa to Miami, including a loop through St.
Petersburg with two connectors to the downtown area.
This thesis situates Cramer within the broader context of Florida highway
development, from the conception of the Dixie Highway to the present, with emphasis on
the simultaneous construction of the Florida Turnpike and the Interstate. Besides
highlighting Cramer’s efforts to shape Eisenhower’s national vision into the system we
know today, attention is given to the battles Cramer fought against state officials to
prevent Florida’s Interstate routes from being altered, delayed, and littered with tolls.

5

The First Wave

In Dirt Roads to Dixie, Howard Lawrence Preston remarked that since the end of
the Civil War, Florida had been developing a reputation as a “recreational haven.”
However, nothing Florida’s early admirers said, wrote, drew, or painted “directly”
changed Florida. In order for actual change to occur, northerners needed access to the
state. Nineteenth century railways spurred the early growth of numerous boomtowns,
notably Miami and Tampa, but at the turn of the twentieth century, Florida remained the
most sparsely populated state in the South. Actual change, Preston remarked, arrived
with the “throng of automobile tourists attracted by the region’s greater accessibility,
which highway progressivism made possible.”4 What the Iron Horse did for the West, the
highway would do for Florida.5
Essentially inaccessible by car as late as 1910, much of Florida lay “beyond
arduous and impassable sands, behind impenetrable morasses of red gumbo and just
around the corner from Stygian cypress swamps and other road unpleasantries,” forcing
tourists to ship their cars by steam or rail to one of Florida’s cities.6 Gradually, cities and
counties built roads according to their needs, and a network developed. Initiated in 1914,
the two major prongs of the Dixie Highway expedited the process of bringing northerners
south. Sending motorists down the Atlantic coast of Florida, the east leg of the Dixie
Highway passed through Jacksonville, St. Augustine, Daytona, Fort Pierce, West Palm
6

Beach, and on to Miami. The western route entered Florida at the panhandle, passing
through Tallahassee on the way to the interior into Gainesville, Ocala, Orlando,
Kissimmee, Bartow, Arcadia, Fort Myers, and Marco, then across the Everglades to
Miami.
The above cities were blessed with a highway through a combination of
geography, power, and luck. To become part of the network, cities bypassed by the
highway had to exercise some initiative of their own and build links. This was especially
true for Tampa and St. Petersburg. Rather than complain that the Dixie Highway had
bypassed them, Tampans worked with neighboring communities to create a link to the
Dixie. In November 1915, the Tampa Daily Times announced that the last part of the
road surface between Tampa and Lakeland would soon be completed, providing thirtyfive miles of some of the best brick road in the country. Although the main Dixie
Highway would not come within forty miles of Tampa, motorists could be tempted to
turn west on this finely-built leg, a road fifteen feet in width rather than the usual nine
feet, with crowning steep enough to evacuate water but not too steep for cars, along with
culverts and concrete bridges with protective rails for passing over waterways. The path
was straight and the grades were smooth.7
Once on the road from Lakeland to Tampa, tourists might be further tempted by
intersecting roads of slightly lesser quality, made of clay, shell, or stone, leading to farms,
tourist sites, or the great unknown.8 From Tampa, motorists could drive to Indian Rocks
beach in about an hour over a “popular auto drive,” passing through “pine forests, orange
groves and several pretty country towns.” A ferry provided access to the island until a
toll-free bridge was completed in 1915, leading to a “shell drive.” Indian Rocks
7

anticipated hundreds of visitors on the bridge’s opening day.9 Until they were brought
into this growing network, many nearby communities remained isolated from incoming
car traffic.
By 1920, Florida had a functional motor transportation system, complete with
main arteries to cities, although there were weaknesses in the system. A 1921 account
claimed that of all counties on the drive from Clearwater to Orlando, Pinellas had the
worst roads. Brick roads on the county line near Oldsmar were “narrow and rough.” On
the turnpike crossing Old Tampa Bay and through Safety Harbor, an unsafe bridge and
bad road conditions caused traffic to be diverted to Sutherland and Dunnedin. Unless the
county made strides, news of bad roads during the upcoming tourist season was sure to
mar the county’s reputation.10
Superintendent of county roads C.E. Burleson helped improve the road system
and modernize the county’s road-building equipment. When Burleson began, the county
presented him with 13 mules, “12 of which he said were half dead.” After four years, he
acquired a sixty horse power tractor that could accomplish as much as three hundred
laborers, a clearing plow and a road grader, five Mack trucks, five army trucks, five
International trucks, and carloads of equipment. Equipped, Burleson’s team could build
one mile of road per day.11 Nevertheless, an observer once complained of seeing only
two men on a Burleson road crew doing any work. The rest were “doing the heavy
looking on.”12
Tampa Bay transportation development made great strides in the 1920s. Daring
projects paid for themselves in no time and extended prosperity to the surrounding areas.
The promise applied to projects big and small. When the bridge to Pass-a-Grille,
8

population twenty, was destroyed by the 1921 hurricane, the Pass-a-Grille Bridge
Company had saved enough in a single year of operation to rebuild and resume traffic by
the end of the year. Gearing up to build the Gandy Bridge from St. Petersburg to Tampa,
promoters looked to the success of the St. Johns River Bridge recently finished in
Jacksonville. While an estimated 80,640 vehicles crossed the bridge in 1922, the St.
John’s River Bridge’s tolls had already paid off twenty percent of its ten-year bonds in
the first year of operation.13
The 1920s thus served as a window of opportunity for George S. Gandy to
construct a bridge linking the commercial city of Tampa to the resort city of St.
Petersburg, a project twenty years in the making. In 1913 the surveys began, followed by
a lengthy application to the War Department to build over navigable waters and the
passage of necessary state legislation. The bridge received full authorization just in time
for World War I and a period of deflation, “when capital ran to cover and refused to be
coaxed.” Local residents finally purchased most of the shares, and construction began in
the fall of 1922.14
“The rhetoric flowed,” noted journalist Leland Hawes, “as dignitaries from
around the nation participated in the official opening” of the Gandy Bridge on November
20, 1924. St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce president Bradford Lawrence
proclaimed, “Two golden shores are now linked by a ribbon of silver.”15 St. Petersburg
mayor Frank Fortune Pulver waxed similarly that the neighboring cities were diamonds
joined by a ribbon of gold.16 Whatever kind of ribbon, the Gandy Bridge stood testament
to the prosperity of the Tampa Bay region while adding to it, uniting a combined
population exceeding one hundred thousand, the largest metropolitan area in the state.17
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Tampa Bay residents, said the St. Petersburg Times, had a great opportunity to “join
hands and work together for the future of southwest Florida.”18
Previous to the Gandy Bridge’s construction, the shortest road from St. Petersburg
to Tampa was 43 miles and the shortest steamboat route covered 22 miles, each route
taking two to three hours. The Gandy Bridge reduced the trip to a mere forty to fifty
minutes, making the linked cities “virtually one.”19 “One will find it hard to think of a
more pleasant evening,” gushed the Times, “the long drive over the moonlit waters, the
car parked out in the middle of the bay for a spell then across to the other shore and
back.” While Tampans and other Floridians would have easier access to gulf coast
fishing, bathing beaches, and “countless resort attractions,” St. Petersburg would have at
its doorstep Tampa’s “quaint Latin colony in Ybor City with its Spanish, Cuban and
Italian atmosphere of romance and the old world,” the “interesting cigar factories,” and
the annual Gasparilla Celebration. It was only a “magnificent pleasure drive” away.20
Completed in the late 1920s, State Road (SR) 19, later US 19, made Pinellas Point
the southern apex of a northern Florida trunk line. No longer would tourists have to drive
through Florida’s interior to get to Tampa Bay. SR 19 shortened the trip from St.
Petersburg to Tallahassee to 250 miles, opening St. Petersburg to “immense traffic” from
northwest Florida. From Tallahassee, SR 19 headed to the gulf through Lamont and
Sirmans, then ran parallel to the coast through Perry, Cross City, Oldtown, across the
Suwannee River, into “the huge development of Homosassa,” and on to St. Petersburg.
A precursor to mid-century expressways, SR 19 was notable for having “no sharp curves”
and “long, easy tangents,” including a 10.2-mile straightaway.21

10

For all of Tampa Bay’s road improvements during the 1920s, the Great
Depression dampened the economic promises. Tolls failed to keep the Gandy Bridge
enterprise solvent. Following the initiative of Senator Claude Pepper and the Roosevelt
Administration, the federal government bailed out the bridge for $2.38 million and lifted
the tolls in 1944 as wartime measures.22 Despite hardships, communities maintained their
road systems and sometimes added modest improvements. Following a 1935 hurricane,
the Works Progress Administration improved the drive between St. Petersburg to Tampa,
rebuilding Tampa’s damaged seawall and adding concrete balconies, benches, and steps
leading down to docks.23
With the rise of automobile usage in Florida came a decline in the use of rails. In
the early 1900s, F.A. Davis dreamed of the day when ten thousand passengers per day
would ride St. Petersburg’s streetcars. In 1917, the city’s rail system reached that
benchmark and was ready for expansion.24 But within a few decades, streetcars were
perceived more as nuisances than conveniences. More people owned cars, and
motorbuses were going where the trolleys could not. In the late 1930s, “Miami’s biggest
traffic headache” stemmed from a traffic island designed for trolleys in the middle of one
of the United States’ busiest intersections. Traffic engineers looked forward to replacing
the trolleys with buses so the island could be removed.25 In 1936, Jacksonville was the
first major city to give up its trolleys, followed by Miami in 1940, Tampa in 1946, and St.
Petersburg in 1949.26
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The Gridlock City

The end of World War II spelled the resumption of automobile manufacturing and
the end of gas rationing. Cars flooded downtown streets; parking spaces filled; horns
blared, and pedestrians ran for cover. In most cities transportation systems directed
traffic to the city centers, and downtowns became clogged with more cars than they could
handle.27
Traffic jams soon threatened city centers, including St. Petersburg’s. “Unless a
solution is found,” predicted a postwar editorial, St. Petersburg’s “entire business district
will […] inevitably be led into economic chaos as customers move to easier parking
grounds.”28 During the 1945 tourist season, finding a parking space in St. Petersburg was
not a problem until late November; by 1946, it was hard to find a space in October. In
1947, it was predicted, parking would be difficult in September, and “we will find the
community strongly united behind a program to do something about traffic.”29 The
efforts were to no avail. In 1949, the city had only nine thousand parking spaces in the
business district to accommodate an estimated eighty thousand vehicles and failed to
create any new spaces the following year. St. Petersburg was becoming better known as
the Gridlock City than the Sunshine City.30
As the city groped for solutions, the problem grew, compelling the St. Petersburg
Times to publish a three-part series on the city’s traffic problems. Although Maas
12

Brothers built a million dollar department store in downtown, decentralization, a natural
reaction to downtown congestion, was already taking place as businesses established
themselves beyond the gridlock. City officials told these maverick proprietors they were
“too far out” to succeed, but the businesses proved them wrong as shopping centers took
hold on the intersection of Lakeview Avenue and 9th Street South; along Central Avenue
at 34th Street and between 68th and 72nd Street; at 34th Street and 9th Avenue North; at 16th
Street and 17th Avenue North; and wherever suburban motels sprouted in place of
traditional urban hotels.31
Each new establishment chipped away at downtown’s drawing power, sales
potential, property value, and tax revenue. Critics suggested mitigating the problem by
replacing Albert Whitted Airport with a parking lot, improving public transportation, and
removing the Atlantic Coast Line railroad tracks along 1st Avenue South. But city
leaders, short on resources and initiative, could not act fast enough to keep up with the
pace of development in other parts of the city.32
Until the 1940s, residential areas were largely confined to the Central Avenue
corridor out to 34th Street, the region beyond being “very thinly peopled.” After the war,
the corridor, and the city’s center of gravity, began to extend farther towards the Gulf of
Mexico. Every year from 1946 to 1949 brought the construction of more than a thousand
homes in the city’s western reaches, and between two and three thousand homes every
year from 1950 to 1952.33 At 34th Street and Central Avenue, entrepreneurs developed
Central Plaza, a major shopping center. The site included two supermarkets, A&P and
Publix; various chains, including Belk, Liggett’s, McCrory’s, Butler, Diana, Kinney, and
Singer; and a few local businesses, including two laundromats and an optometrist.34
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Holding its grand opening in 1952, an estimated fifty thousand customers visited Central
Plaza on its first day of business.35
As development expanded inland, so did St. Petersburg’s transportation agenda,
and asphalt spread like kudzu across the peninsula. By the mid-1950s, finding solutions
for downtown’s gridlock slid from the city’s agenda as planners began envisioning a
comprehensive, countywide grid system in place of “the awkward system that now
exists.”36 Fourth Street had only four lanes up to Thirtieth Avenue North, where traffic
was then squeezed into two lanes up to Gandy Boulevard. Drivers, especially patrons of
the Derby Lane dog track and Tampa’s Jai-Alai Fronton, would “pass at random,”
“causing many collisions.” This “traffic headache” and the addition of the Courtney
Campbell Bridge prompted the six-laning of Fourth Street and four-laning of Gandy
Boulevard.37 In 1957, the city put into effect a truck route “to relieve congestion from
thoroughfares” and “speed truck traffic through the city.”38 Planners kicked around the
idea of making the county’s roads more amenable to industry and envisioned a “multimillion dollar bridge and causeway program linking the Gulf beaches.”39 As St.
Petersburg four-laned Tyrone Boulevard and designated 66th Street as a main artery,
plans went into motion for another crossroads shopping center where 66th Street
intersected 18th Avenue North, this one larger than Central Plaza.40 In 1963, the county
gave St. Petersburg another east-west artery, extending 22nd Avenue North from 34th
Street to Tyrone Boulevard.41 Taking advantage of the freeze of 1962, the city contracted
to remove ten thousand dead trees from needed rights-of-way. Residents complained
when some of the removed trees “didn’t appear dead.”42
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On into the late 1950s, downtown still experienced record-breaking traffic jams,
especially when major events coincided with spring training and when bad weather
prohibited beach ventures. Webb’s City continued to have huge sales days, bringing in
$175,000 in one day in March of 1957, but by 1963 it was evident that the “oldfashioned, rundown commercial establishments” that occupied downtown were
increasingly “doomed by competition.”43 The gridlock subsided enough that City
Manager Lynn Andrews proposed removing the city’s parking meters.44
While city and county transportation systems grew, regional and statewide
projects imposed major changes on St. Petersburg. At the end of the war, a network of
highways and bridges connected the city to Tampa, Jacksonville, Tallahassee, and
beyond, but the path to Miami still presented a glaring obstacle. Along the east coast,
travelers could follow US 1 all the way down to the Overseas Highway to Key West. On
the west coast, however, travelers following US 19 had to negotiate Tampa Bay by
veering inland or by taking chances with the Beeline ferry from Pinellas Point to
Manatee.
On the morning the Beeline ferry resumed service at the close of World War II,
forty cars waited in line to board a barge built to hold twenty-eight cars. That day, a
single ferry carried 217 cars. The Beeline acquired two more ferries after they were
decommissioned from wartime service, but the crossing remained an inconvenience, not
to mention discontinuations in service due to labor strikes.45 One motorist complained of
arriving at Pinellas Point an hour early for the last ferry to Manatee. After buying his
ticket, agents told him that the ferry was full and that he would have to drive around the
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bay. Angrily, the motorist remarked, “Good will created on the spot is surely worth as
much as many colorful posters up north.”46
Determined to devise a better way to cross the bay, the St. Petersburg Port
Authority considered building a tunnel, but engineers decided that a lower bay bridge
would be more realistic.47 Completed in 1954, the Sunshine Skyway Bridge made it easy
to cross the southern portion of Tampa Bay.
Subsequently, US 19 quickly rose in prominence. To the south of the Skyway, US
19 joined with highways 41 and 301 in the city of Palmetto, leading to the construction of
a new bridge across the Manatee River and the four-laning of US 41 to accommodate the
increased traffic.48 At the northern end of the Skyway, US 19 replaced US 92 along 4th
Street as St. Petersburg’s main north-south artery. The sudden presence of traffic created
demand for the Bayway Bridge across Boca Ciega Bay to sites along barrier islands to
the west such as Pass-a-Grille, the Don Cesar Hotel, and Pine Key.49 In 1963, traffic at
the crossing of US 19 and 54th Avenue South prompted the city council to consider
installing traffic lights.”50 Meanwhile, the intersection of US 19 and US 98 was deemed
“one of the most dangerous in Florida.” A third of a mile before the intersection, one of
the highways narrowed dangerously from four to two lanes. The state planned to upgrade
the routes into divided four-lane highways, with one-way drives separated by islands, a
concept that roadside business proprietors were reluctant to accept.51
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Terrific Amount of Rock

With the reign of the automobile, St. Petersburg businesses touted their parking
spaces as much as their actual services. With a parking lot on Central Avenue and 19th
Street that accommodated 110 cars for free, the Home Federal Savings and Loan
Association encouraged its customers to “Save without fuss ...the parking’s on us!”52
Central Plaza Bank and Trust Company claimed to be “Surrounded By Convenience.”
Occupying an entire block on US 19 between 2nd and 3rd Street, the bank offered parking
on every side of the building and a drive-through option, making Central Plaza Bank
“The Symbol of Banking Convenience.”53
“Cars, Cars, and More Cars ... a typical Suncoast scene,” read the caption to a St.
Petersburg Times photograph in which Fords and Chevrolets were lined up bumper-tobumper on a four-lane city street with yet more cars occupying every parking space.54
Throughout the postwar years, Tampa Bay’s population grew remarkably dependent on
automobiles. In the Tampa-St. Petersburg Metropolitan area, the 1960 census reported
that 77 percent of central city inhabitants either drove their own cars or car-pooled. In
suburban areas, that figure was 81 percent.55 That year, Pinellas guzzled 109 million
gallons of gasoline, with the state burning 1¾ billion gallons.56 In the three counties
adjoining Tampa Bay, registered cars reached a total of 353,359. Pinellas County’s
numbers were striking. From 1950 to 1959, Pinellas experienced a 176 percent increase
17

in car registrations.57 Although Pinellas was Florida’s second-smallest county in total
area, it had nearly 163,000 registered vehicles, 9,000 more vehicles than Hillsborough
County. Statewide, only Dade County had more registered vehicles.58
The state as a whole also experienced an exponential rise in car usage. In the
1950s – the decade that Florida became the nation’s fastest growing state – Florida’s
highways became among America’s most traveled. This was largely due to the state’s
massive number of tourist drivers. By 1962, Florida was drawing an estimated 10.6 to
11.5 million tourists every year and expecting “an ever-swelling tide of tourists” in the
future. Statistics confirm that the overwhelming majority of these tourists preferred to
drive – and often not just to singular destinations, but all over the state. In 1956, out of a
sample of 4,932 visitors to the St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce, 81.5 percent came
by car. Many visitors made a “circle tour” down one Florida coastline and looping back
up the other.59
Florida’s residents also preferred to drive. Car culture had so pervaded Florida
that when the St. Petersburg Times discovered that a Circuit Court judge still actually
commuted to and from Dade City “via Choo Choo,” reporters were incredulous. Despite
the judge’s commitment to the Atlantic Coast Line, the closest depot to his home was
seven miles away in Trilby. From there, he depended on a cab.60 By 1960, Florida’s
resident drivers ranked ninth in the nation at three million. With tourists and residents
combined, Florida ranked third only behind California and New York in the number of
highway-using vehicles, edging ahead of the higher-populated Texas.61
Statewide, Florida struggled to keep up with the automobile invasion. By and
large, citizens had the will to build the necessary highways, the ideas were there, and so
18

were the money and materials, but the government experienced a great deal of difficulty
getting organized and, after that, staying on track. During Governor Fuller Warren’s
administration some ambitious projects went into motion, particularly the Jacksonville
expressway system. However, it might also be said that Warren’s administration adhered
to the spoils system of government. Duval County, home of Warren and the Jacksonville
expressway, received far more funds than any other county during Warren’s
administration, in 1953 soaking up almost twice as much state primary road funds as any
other county. Despite the funds heaped on the expressway, the Tampa Tribune reported
in 1954 that although bond issues had been raised and spent to speed the expressway’s
completion, the state had thus far neglected to do its part. 62
Meanwhile, several demographically small, undeserving counties received far
more than their fair share as road agendas in developing parts of the state went hungry.63
In December 1951, the Tampa Morning Tribune reported that Hernando had received
more state road money than Hillsborough since Warren’s inauguration, even though,
according to the last census, Hillsborough’s population was 249,894 while Hernando’s
was 6,693.64 This spoke of the unchecked power of the road board and its chairmanship.
Regardless of how much the counties gave the state in gasoline taxes, they were only
guaranteed a twenty percent return; the other eighty percent was spent at the state’s
discretion; while Hernando was the home of Warren’s appointed road board chairman,
Alfred A. McKethan.65
During McKethan’s chairmanship, Hernando turned its share of the gasoline tax
over to the state along with $30,000 a year in county road funds. What the state did with
the sum of state and local funds raised a few eyebrows. McKethan donated, at what he
19

deemed “considerable sacrifice,” seven-and-a-half acres on the gulf for county parkland
at Pine Island; then the road department contracted to build a bridge and highway to the
park passing directly through McKethan’s adjacent property, this one privately
developed. Meanwhile, the parkland was dredged and filled at the state’s expense.
Whether it was even prudent to dredge the area was questionable. E.A. Lopez, Jr. of the
Laguna Corportation admitted that his company’s dredge, operating at $25.45 per hour,
was working constantly and running into “a terrific amount of rock.” In a few months,
Laguna took in $13,000 from the Pine Island project.66
In other parts of the state, McKethan was accused of putting politics before civicmindedness. According to the Range Line Road Association, a group representing
Sarasota and neighboring municipalities, a proposed bridge crossing the Manatee River
ought to have directed traffic onto Fifteenth Street rather than First Street, thus avoiding
the creation of a new bottleneck in the already congested Bradenton. Only a “selfish”
minority was “anxious for the bridge to be placed” at First Street. Local mayors and
county commissioners agreed on this and convinced McKethan’s engineers of the ideal
location. Then, McKethan was reportedly “cornered” by a few individuals and changed
the route to First Street, where the bridge landing was eventually built.67 McKethan was
also accused of arranging a major highway from the northeastern United States to Tampa
Bay (probably US 301) to “ben[d] at right-angles through Starke to pass [Senator]
Charley Johns’ tourist cabins.”68
Sources indicate that much of the damage inflicted during previous
administrations was rectified during the brief administration of Governor Daniel T.
McCarty and his road board. Where previous road boards hired unnecessary staff and
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initiated narrow-sighted road projects for the benefit of a privileged minority, McCarty’s
board laid off four hundred employees, eliminated six million dollars worth of unworthy
road projects, and started practical projects which would receive approval and funding
from the federal government.69
McCarty’s road board chairman, Richard Simpson, was well regarded among his
colleagues and throughout the state. As a former speaker of the state legislature, he was,
according to the Tampa Morning Tribune, an “advocate of good government who was
deliberate in action and fair-minded in argument.”70 Thomas B. Manuel of the fourth
district expressed gratitude for Simpson’s “advice and counsel and for the consideration
shown by you and the entire Board to the traffic needs of this district.” During its first
meeting, Simpson’s board agreed to allocate funds “regardless of location, based on
engineering reports showing the greatest need.” Manuel’s fourth district included Dade
County, which contributed nearly eighteen percent of the state’s gasoline tax, while the
district as a whole contributed nearly thirty percent. Historically, the fourth district did
not receive its fair share of funding and was in constant need of improvements. By the
end of 1953, the fourth district had forty-eight projects under construction and $55
million in new projects slated for 1954.71
Likewise, board member J. Saxton Lloyd of Daytona Beach brought to his home
county of Volusia $900,000 for four-laning and improving parts of the heavily burdened
US 1 along with another $496 million for a bypass truck route. Not one to privilege his
county unfairly, Lloyd also sought federal assistance for improvements to US 1 in other
parts of his district.72
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Governor McCarty suffered a heart attack and died in his first year in office.
Senate President Charley Johns took over shortly thereafter; subsequently, the tenure of
McCarty’s proactive road board was also cut short. On December 11, 1953, Johns
suspended the entire road board and turnpike authority and appointed new officials in
their place. 73 As the new road board set to work, Johns campaigned for the 1954
gubernatorial election. Soon, the entire state began to notice that a flimsy style of politics
dictating the administration’s road agenda. By summer, people from all around the state
were complaining about Johns’s ill-conceived road agenda.
The Tampa Bay area was especially critical of Johns, particularly after he ordered
road board chairman Cecil M. Webb to hold hearings for a toll reduction on the Sunshine
Skyway – still under construction – to one dollar. Webb took the matter to Coverdale
and Colpitts, the consulting firm that set the toll-rate based on calculated earnings
statements. The firm responded that although the reduced toll would induce a hundred
thousand more cars across the bridge every year, five hundred thousand annual crossings
would be needed to make up for the lost revenue. Johns’s move was interpreted as purely
political, not practical. Johns, it was suggested, ought to turn his attention to the
completion of US 19, which to date forced “1.2 miles of east-west driving detours and
about three miles of travel on ordinary city streets” through St. Petersburg, the
inconvenience resulting in “a potential loss of $70,000 or more in [Skyway] revenues.”74
Simpson also accused Johns’s road board of rushing “skeleton or incomplete
plans,” giving contractors only two days to study the plans and make bids. To cover their
assets, contractors would bid high, so high that the Bureau of Public Roads would refuse
to finance the project. Chairman Webb responded that Florida could still use the federal
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money on other projects, but Simpson pointed out that federal money had to be matched
by state money, which was in limited supply; in recent years the state lost nearly $12
million in unmatched federal money. Examples of lost federal funding due to rushed
contracts included the northern approach to the Skyway, the San Marco overpass on the
Jacksonville Expressway, and a stretch of US 1 north of Jacksonville.75
Johns’s reign was especially felt in Tampa. Where McCarty’s administration set
out to extend the Dale Mabry Highway northward – eventually connecting it to US 41
and US 19 near Weeki Wachee Springs, “vastly improv[ing] access to Tampa from the
two main tourist routes into the West Coast area” and “speed[ing] up local traffic by
taking pressure off the approaches to U.S. 41” – Johns promised voters in Sulphur
Springs that he would block the extension of the Dale Mabry Highway north of
Hillsborough Avenue in order to force traffic to drive past Sulphur Springs’ motels and
attractions. “Consider what this means to the growth of Tampa,” pointed out the Tampa
Morning Tribune. Not only was Johns’s proposal poorly conceived, it was ill informed;
his own road department had already begun construction on Dale Mabry north of
Hillsborough Avenue.76
Perhaps Johns’s biggest mistake in his bid for governor was “heaping unjustified
abuse” on Simpson’s suspended road board. Simpson, initially accepting his suspension
gracefully, could “no longer sit still” as Johns publicly denounced him and his colleagues
as a “do-nothing” board that would not “cooperate” with him. Simpson, well versed in
Johns’s record, unleashed some criticism of his own while helping gubernatorial
candidate LeRoy Collins shape a road agenda that would win the voters’ confidence. As
for his lack of cooperation with “the Acting Governor,” Simpson recalled being
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reprimanded by Johns three times: “for refusing to find some way to change a contract in
favor of a senator’s friend at a loss (to the state) of approximately $100,000;” for not
granting “special consideration” to a contractor; and for not inflating a property
assessment for a friend of Johns. As for the “do-nothing” board, Simpson explained:
“When we took over […] we found the road department in the worst financial condition
in its history. … The total deficit […] was close to $28,000,000. […] The McCarty road
board met the deficit, carried on a creditable, if limited, building program and
accumulated enough cash to make the 1954 program possible. […] History will show that
1953 was the most constructive year of the Road Department since its creation.”77
Johns also accused Simpson’s board of budgeting only a million dollars for the
Jacksonville expressway merely “in order to keep it alive” for political reasons. In reality,
said Simpson, the McCarty administration “told the people the full truth about the
expressway. We pulled it down from a heaven of promises and made out of it a fine
practical project, actually spending around two million dollars of State money on it.”
Johns, Simpson recalled, was more severe than McCarty, openly refusing to spend any
more than “what normally would be spent” in Duval so that more funds would be
available for his own district.78
Other criticisms of Johns included “openly and brazenly promising roads and
bridges far beyond his ability to deliver;” hiring a Director of Wildlife Exhibits even
though the Road Department did not have a wildlife exhibit; hiring three extra lawyers
for the Jacksonville expressway though there was not enough work for one; and
needlessly inflating the costs of a proposed turnpike. “In view of the present situation,”
quipped Simpson, “non-cooperation may be regarded as a mark of distinction.” The
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chief engineer of the road department, Sam Turnbull, concurred. After twenty-eight
years of service and only twenty-two months before retirement, Turnbull resigned from
his post, remarking that Johns’s road board needed “a political engineer instead of a
professional one.”79

25

Interlopers

With Johns in power, proponents of progressive government began to take steps
towards reforming Florida’s road department. In the 1950s, the five members of the state
road board represented the congressional districts as drawn in 1937. With board
members elected for four-year terms by the governor, Senator B.C. Pearce complained
that the system provided “no continuity from administration to administration:” “A
governor appoints a road board that develops a program that fits in with his ideas. That
program is just under way well when a new governor is elected. He names his own road
board and, more often than not, its ideas are directly opposite those of its predecessor
board. So it throws out the old program and starts one of its own.”80
In 1954, the state Legislative Council organized a special committee to make “an
exhaustive study of all phases of Florida road building with a view toward drafting
recommendations for a highway code.” Some suggested staggering road board
appointments to create more continuity. Pearce, a committee member, wanted to see an
elected board member from each of the eight congressional districts, with the state as a
whole electing a chairman. Others asked, “What’s the point?” The congressional district
lines were no fairer than the road districts’.81
While campaigning in 1954, Collins heard pleas to save Florida from outmoded
transportation governance. The Dade County Central Labor Union complained of
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Florida’s “spoils system” of government, which with every new administration brought
the firing of hundreds of road workers. In response, Collins favored “career service” and
promised to “take politics out of State employment.”82 Just as the Range Line Association
turned to Collins with its bridge predicament, the citizens of Port St. Joe sought salvation
from a highway from Apalachicola that, at the behest of Johns’s crony George Tapper,
was going to transform Harrison Avenue, through the community’s “nicest residential
section,” into a major thoroughfare. Johns reportedly gave Port St. Joe an ultimatum:
take the highway as planned, or be bypassed altogether: not a viable option for St. Joe
Paper Company.83
Near Lake Okeechobee, Tom Gaskins was fighting with all his might to save “a
beautiful Cabbage and Oak Hammock that thousands of visitors have admired” in the
middle of his Cypress Knee Museum site from being destroyed by a rerouting of US 27.
“[I]t’s not just some small filling station they are going to ruin,” howled Gaskins,
explaining that his attraction was listed on “pictorial road maps of Florida, recommended
by the A.A.A. and other tour guides,” and “written up in many national magazines.”
Convinced that a hostile government intended to destroy him, Gaskins turned to Collins
as a last resort, vowing to “spend a great deal of thought in publicizing this dastardly act”
if it came to fruition, as it sadly did.84
In this atmosphere of frustration, Collins ran for governor with the promise of
modernizing the government. Progressives were hungry for a methodical system of
government that ceased to allow small-county officials, ‘pork-choppers,’ to dictate where
to build the state’s highways. Collins and his administrative assistant, Joe Grotegut,
received tips on Johns’s misdeeds and valuable advice from a network of insiders,
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including Simpson. With this, Collins took a firm stand on road issues and organized
solid support by seeking to eliminate politics from road planning; supporting staggered
terms for road board members; rejecting the division of road money based on antiquated
district lines; and promoting “a legal designation of a state arterial system” with provision
for “ultimate, reasonable, limited access features.” Although Collins knew where he
thought new superhighways should be built, he emphasized that such decisions are “not
for the Governor to decide.”85
Although, as we shall see, the Collins administration can be credited with
temporarily kicking the state’s turnpike program into high gear, the governor could not
follow through with all of his promises. In particular, he was unable to establish order in
the state road department. In Florida, as in many other states, business as usual was
frequently unethical; some acts, if not criminal in the legal sense, should have been.
Collins, though himself an agent of change, would be a victim of unfortunate timing, his
term coinciding with a surge of investigations into Florida’s highway construction
outlays, with some of the blame resting with the governor and his appointees for not
whipping the road department into shape.
Scott Kelly, appointed chairman of the senate’s Public Roads and Highways
Committee in June 1959, created the Legislative Interim Committee on Public Roads and
Highways to develop legislation to address problems with the road department. From
October 1959 to April 1961, the Kelly Committee ran hearings throughout the state,
revealing evidence of “bribery, substandard work, conflicts of interest, profiteering,
kickbacks, waste and corruption.” The accused included “contractors, material suppliers,
engineers, real estate investors,” as well as politicians. Numerous road department
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employees were caught accepting gifts and paychecks from contractors. Committee
members included Senator Johns and Legislator E.C. Rowell, who were especially eager
to find dirt on Collins’s road board. In this, the committee was successful, as Collins’s
road board members were caught in conflicts of interest involving building materials and
real estate along the right of way, with one member’s parcel of land originally appraised
for $3,200 reappraised for $41,107 before being sold to the state.86
The investigation revealed what was already widely known about Florida’s
Democratic establishment, which was entrenched, stuck in its ways, and without serious
challenge for over a century. Even Governor Collins was unable to act fast enough to
make long overdue changes in government operations. Metropolitan areas, especially the
Tampa Bay region and Dade County, had had enough. As long as small county
representatives dominated state politics, soaked metropolitan areas for taxes, and gave
little back in return, metropolitan counties would blast the pork chop agenda. In the
1950s, Republicans created a small but meaningful dent in the Democratic hegemony,
installing representatives not just into federal judgeships and postmaster general
positions, but also into city councils, county commissions, the state legislature, and the
United States Congress.
St. Petersburg and Pinellas County led the Republican revolution. As with many
of Florida’s cities, migrants flooded into St. Petersburg, and the city grew in just a few
decades from a quaint resort town into a bustling city. Most of St. Petersburg’s residents
were not from Florida – fewer than 20 percent were Florida natives in 1950; and most
residents were not even drawn from the South, but the Midwest. The newcomers brought
with them Republican politics. The status quo was not deeply invested in the ‘Southern
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way of life,’ especially when it came to politics.87 Instead, this maverick city acquired a
fighting, can-do spirit, spanned impressive bridges across the bay, grew, and prospered.
Fighting for fair representation from its inception, the relationship of Pinellas County to
neighboring Hillsborough and the state as a whole was like David to Goliath. No longer
satisfied with trying to reform the Democratic Party from within, a homegrown
Republican populace transformed the county into a GOP stronghold and sent Florida’s
first Republican congressman since Reconstruction to Washington.
The life of Congressman William Cato Cramer is illustrative of Tampa Bay’s
transformation. Cramer was born in Colorado in 1922, and he migrated with his family to
St. Petersburg when he was three years old. William’s mother worked as a laundress and
his father peddled citrus. A St. Petersburg Times reporter wrote of him: “If Cramer
believes that in this nation any poor railsplitter can become President, it is not so much
the life of Lincoln that tells him so, but his own life. He is right out of Horatio Alger.”88
Signs of Cramer’s political destiny were evident early in his youth.
Foreshadowing his conservative law-and-order agenda, his classmates at Lealman Junior
High elected him as the lieutenant colonel of the schoolboy patrol. Cramer stayed
engaged in student government at St. Petersburg High School and St. Petersburg Jr.
College. During World War II, he joined the Navy’s V-12 program, where he “turned the
tragedy of war into a personal opportunity,” attending the University of North Carolina,
rising to the rank of lieutenant, and serving his country in Southern France on D-Day.
While completing his studies at UNC, he convinced Dean E. N. Griswold to admit him to
Harvard law school.89
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In 1948, his studies behind him, Cramer returned home to an American South
undergoing a profound political shift. For years, Gallup polls showed a majority of
southerners believing “the South would be better off, in general, if there were two
political parties of about equal strength instead of one strong party.” From 1939 to 1946,
the percentage favoring two parties increased from 57 to 62 percent. During a similar
period, 1932 to 1944, the percentage of southerners voting Democrat decreased from 76
to 69 percent, and in Florida the percentage fell from 75 to 70 percent. “Competition”
was widely considered “essential to a sound democracy” and necessary to “help build
ideas” – “and the south could sure use some new ideas,” quipped an observer. It was also
argued that if democrats nationwide could no longer take the South for granted, the
region might receive “more attention from Washington and have greater say in
Democratic party councils.”90
President Harry Truman expedited the South’s transformation. At the request of
“Black leaders,” Truman formed the President’s Commission on Civil Rights, which
released a report in 1947 entitled To Secure These Rights. The report was more than a
bland statement of the nation’s race problems; it was a call to action that “sketched out
the liberal agenda on civil rights for the next twenty years.”91 Truman’s Committee was
repulsed by the perverse treatment of blacks, “a kind of moral dry rot which eats away at
the emotional and rational basis of democratic beliefs.” There was also a political
motive. Truman believed that the black vote would help reelect him in 1948.92 For
segregationist southern Democrats, this affront, plus the approval of Hubert Humphrey’s
civil rights plank, along with the nomination of Truman for a second term, prompted the
formation of the Dixiecrats.93
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With the Democratic Party in splinters, the time was ripe for change, and few
counties were as ready as Pinellas. “Give Pinellas County A Two Party System,” was the
battle cry in 1948. “If a two party system is good for the nation, it is good for Florida and
Pinellas County,” announced Ohio Senator Robert Taft. That year left a few chinks in
the armor of Pinellas Democrats, with Dewey receiving 24,900 votes to Truman’s 15,724
and Republicans capturing numerous positions, including two county commission seats,
the supervisor of registration, justice of the peace, and tax assessor. Now a young
lawyer, Cramer took notice, betrayed his family’s party affiliation, and led the charge as
Republicans geared up for the election of 1950.94
Adeptly exploiting the political circumstances, Cramer’s Republican surge came
as a complete surprise to “the slumbering Democrats who were not used to GOP
challenges.” “[O]ut-organized,” “out-hustled,” and “smeared,” Democrats hardly knew
what hit them as fourteen of fifteen county offices went to Republicans and Cramer was
elevated to the state legislature. Summing up the election, a St. Petersburg Times cartoon
depicted a “herd of stampeding elephants running roughshod over a sole donkey.” As St.
Petersburg became Florida’s undisputed Capital of the Republican Party, the Times cried
out, “Hey, We Said A Two Party System!” “Almost overnight,” concluded political
scientist Darryl Paulson, “Cramer transformed Republicans from minor players in local
politics to the party that would dominate Pinellas politics for the next half century.”95
Two other Republicans accompanied Cramer to Tallahassee, and Cramer did
everything in his power to make their presence known. “We used the U.S. House rules,”
Cramer recalled, “insisted on our rights, held caucuses, nominated me as Speaker of the
House. I got three votes.” When Democrats held a caucus to distribute pageboy jobs,
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Cramer introduced his first resolution “lamenting” the exclusion of the minority party.
With an air of “condescending tolerance,” Democrats granted the interlopers another
page. Cramer also proposed a resolution expressing “appreciation and gratitude” to
General Douglas MacArthur, recently terminated by Truman. Democrats “mashed” the
resolution, 14 to 62. In general, there was little the trio could do to “ripple the placid
Democratic pond,” so Cramer cosponsored favorable Democratic bills.96
During Cramer’s first and only term in the state legislature, Eisenhower and the
GOP made some inroads in the South. In 1952, six southern Republicans were elected to
the House of Representatives, five of them from contiguous Blue Ridge districts in
Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina. Cramer himself ran for Congress, but lost
narrowly to Courtney Campbell, ostensibly “on the count of absentee ballots.” Cramer
returned to Pinellas, where he again practiced law, was appointed county attorney, and
“never stopped running” for Congress.97
As county attorney, a part-time, $5,000-a-year position, Cramer “represented the
county in legal matters involving rights-of-way, sewers, submerged land, and the control
of dogs and hot-rodders.” For extra services, he charged the county extra, and for this he
received criticism. As a minority party, Republicans had promised to eliminate or revise
the post of county attorney, otherwise known as the “sixth commissioner,” deeming the
position too powerful not to be accountable to voters; but once in power, republicans
neglected to relinquish the office. To his credit, Cramer drafted legislation that would
create a “fulltime legal department” with a salary “worthy of an attorney’s time.” Long
after Cramer’s departure the bill finally passed.98
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George Gallup remarked back in 1946 that “the more taste a southern state has of
an effective two-party system, the more it likes that system.”99 Florida’s top Democrats
were cognizant of this problem in 1954, as gubernatorial candidate LeRoy Collins and
United States Senators Spessard Holland and George Smathers campaigned in St.
Petersburg for the reelection of Florida’s seven United States Representatives – all
Democrats.100 That year, Gallup’s observation still held, as southern Republicans lost
one House seat but gained two more, both in metropolitan districts: Bruce Alger of
Dallas, and Cramer, Florida’s first Republican Congressman “since the days of President
Andrew Johnson.” In addition, Republicans won seven seats in the Florida legislature.101
That same year, the Supreme Court decision, Brown versus the Board of
Education, outlawed segregation in public schools, and quickly alienated southerners
from the Republican Party. Drafted by Eisenhower appointee Chief Justice Earl Warren,
the decision dismayed the president. Nevertheless, in 1957, Eisenhower upheld the
verdict with force in Little Rock, Arkansas, sealing the Republican fate in the South.
After 1954, the South elected no new Republicans for the rest of the decade. For the
moment at least, Gallup was wrong; the South had its fill of Republicans, though Cramer
was already in office.102
In Washington, Cramer placed friend and assistant Jack Insco on the
congressional payroll as “district assistant.” With Insco as his “eyes, ears and alter ego,”
Cramer was able to “build a political party from one thousand miles away” as he “wooed
his new constituency without mercy:” “His weekly reports were carried that first term on
13 radio and three television stations in his four-county district, more than 5,000
newsletters were mailed from his office every two weeks, he toured the district whenever
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possible in an office-trailer to hear complaints and requests, and he made 182 speeches,
as many as 51 a month.” Cramer was everywhere. According to legend, “if two
members of the GOP chanced to meet on a street corner, he showed up, too.” Never
missing a meeting, Cramer was appointed Republican National Committeeman.
Eventually, Pinellas Republicans rivaled Democrats in numbers.103
Although an ardent organizer for the GOP, Cramer’s Republican loyalty was
consistently trumped by two agendas. First, he supported the “conservative coalition:”
“that amalgamation of conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats that
materializes when the issue involves the rights of the states – or the rights of the Negro
minority.” As long as he served in the House his coalition support “never slipped below
73 percent;” in 1959 he had a “perfect 100 score;” and in 1956 he insisted on signing the
Southern Manifesto, though he later considered the decision a mistake.104 The only
matter to rival his conservatism, ironically, was a bill that frequently challenged the rights
of the states: the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956.
Cramer’s appointment to the Roads Subcommittee of the House Public Works
Committee during the development of the interstate highway system was a case of being,
to borrow one of the politician’s most commonly used phrases, “in the right place at the
right time.” Florida had an exceptional number of vehicles on its roads, and so did the
nation as a whole. Transport for a new America required a new kind of highway. In the
age of the high-speed automobile, the same highway could not satisfy both the need for
local access and for high-speed motion. Traditional highways had been “encroached
upon by commercial . . . uses,” resulting in “disorderly strips of commercial
development” which contributed to the “progressive deterioration of adjacent residential
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communities,” and it forced traffic to merge from a standstill onto high-speed lanes,
increasing the chances of a collision.105
During World War II, the United States found the highway it wanted in a nonstop,
limited access, divided highway called the German Autobahn. On such a highway,
Americans would be able to travel hundreds of miles without ever having to wait at an
intersection, without worrying whether around the next bend or over the next hill a
motorist was going to merge onto the highway from a dead stop, creating the potential for
a deadly accident; without having to stare into the headlights of a oncoming truck only to
discover a moment too late that the truck had drifted into oncoming traffic.
The 1950s proved a monumental decade in federal road funding. Since 1939,
when the United States began gearing up for World War II, each successive presidential
administration “argued in favor of relatively low road outlays.” At last, in 1954, President
Dwight Eisenhower “endorsed a big jump in road spending,” issuing reports that
America’s highways “had deteriorated to a point where drastic action was necessary.”106
Cramer was at the end of his first term when Eisenhower pushed through his giant public
works bill. As a junior member of the roads subcommittee, Cramer played a minor role
in the initial shaping of the bill and immersed himself in all aspects of the monumental
legislation while learning the ropes in Washington.
By the end of the decade, Cramer was coming into his own as a public works
legislator. Working closely with interstate program experts and officials, Cramer relished
the complexities of Washington and soon was reshaping and drafting amendments to the
interstate program. On the one hand, Cramer was very collaborative and eager to work
with individuals on either side of the aisle who wanted to see the project to its fruition.
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On the other hand, he was extremely combative and quick to find errors, especially under
Democratic rule. He could be irritating, but colleagues soon recognized that debates with
Cramer generally yielded strong, well-considered resolutions. Couple his lawmaking
ability with his rising influence, first as senior Republican on the roads subcommittee and
then on the public works committee, and by 1963 Cramer was assuming a fairly
influential role in Washington. By extension, he effectively insinuated himself into
Florida highway politics, using every bit of knowledge, every connection, and every tool
at his disposal to shape the state’s highway systems to the ends he saw fit.
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Bobtail

Before the advent of interstate and other limited-access highways, Florida faced
dire challenges in providing safe and convenient routes for tourists and citizens. When
LeRoy Collins ran for governor in 1954, letters flowed into his office on what to do about
the state’s most important north-south thoroughfare, overburdened US 1. “If U.S. 1 had
been intelligently handled from the beginning,” said one observer, “Florida would have
no great problem now; however towns were permitted to grow up on the highway, local
jurisdiction was allowed, schools were permitted to be built, quite unnecessarily right on
the highway, with the result that from Jacksonville to Miami there are hundreds, maybe
thousands of ‘School Slow’ signs. . . . Today a driver is fortunate and able indeed who
can drive from Jacksonville to Miami in less than fourteen hours whereas he should be
able to do it in seven.”107
Collins responded that US 1 could be four-laned, as it should have been from the
start, but “current road funds” would not permit a major overhaul transforming US 1 into
the north-south artery that Florida needed.108 That need would have to be fulfilled by the
construction of a project that had been on the minds of highway advocates for years.
As early as 1941, the state of Florida had considered proposals for a statewide
thru-highway providing easy access to Miami from the Georgia border. Florida highway
promoters proclaimed that with the five-day week, the desire of Americans to “see more
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of their native land,” retirement plans, and vacations, people were “taking to the
highways of this country by the millions.” The war effort undercut the possibility of such
projects, but by the early 1950s, the “spectacular growth of Florida” and the “desire of
tourists to visit all sections of Florida” made it imperative for the state to build a northsouth limited access highway.109
For $62 million, the Warren administration found the state could build the first
segment of a limited access turnpike. Exploring the possibilities, a delegation from
Simpson’s road board visited the Pennsylvania Turnpike and the New Jersey Turnpike,
seeking assurance that an expressway would not make “Ghost Towns” along the previous
routes. They returned “feeling that the turnpikes were practical, that they did not tend to
harm by-passed communities, and that they had good public acceptance.” Nevertheless,
the question was still a toss-up. Florida lacked the “large centers of population” and
“industry found in the states visited,” as well as the “vast number of vehicles” needed to
justify a turnpike. Then again, the “experience of other states” had shown that traffic
could be “induced” and make for a “successful venture.”110
Simpson’s Road Board recommended the construction of this expressway by a
turnpike authority and that the agency should be authorized by the Florida legislature.
That way, the authority would have better legal standing and would be established in a
more democratic manner, as opposed to authorization from a handful of officials on the
Internal Improvement Commission or the Road Board.111 Simpson’s board also
expanded the Warren administration’s plans, but through the Johns administration, the
turnpike had still not been set into motion. According to Simpson, Johns needlessly
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managed to inflate the cost by forty percent, at a profit to the consulting firm, Parsons,
Brinkerhoff, Hall and McDonald.112
While the state talked about building a turnpike, the Sunshine Skyway Bridge
linked the lower Pinellas peninsula to the mainland. Completed in September of 1954,
the bridge marked a new level of commitment to road construction, demonstrating the
revolutionary progress that a major transportation project could bring to the state. It was
widely recognized, in Florida, and throughout the nation, that the completion of the
Skyway marked a new era in Florida’s development. The New York Times dubbed the
Skyway “the most important single factor in the entire area it is to serve,” accelerating
fruit traffic, closing the gap to Miami, and generating an anticipated million dollars
annually in toll revenue.113 In 1954, the Florida Power Company predicted that
population increases on the west coast of Florida would nearly double, up from 17.5
percent over the usual five-year period to 31.79 percent, while in five years increases in
retail sales would jump from 14.5 percent to 31.7 percent.114
Indeed, a new era in the region’s history had begun. “St. Petersburg at
midcentury,” writes historian Raymond Arsenault, “was closer to its past than to its
future.”115 In the decades following construction of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, “the
entire Tampa Bay region would be transformed into a spiraling metropolis.”116 The west
coast of Florida at the end of the war, said another observer, consisted of “a string of
isolated communities with long stretches of undeveloped land separating them.”117 With
the Skyway closing the last major gap on the gulf coast, cities such as St. Petersburg,
Sarasota, Clearwater, Bradenton, Tarpon Springs, Venice, and Naples became prominent
features of the once desolate west coast landscape.
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Amidst celebration of the new bridge, Collins pronounced himself the governor
who would build the turnpike. His election closely coinciding with the bridge’s
completion, Collins deemed the achievement “of tremendous importance to the future of
a great area of Florida.” In it, he saw the “vision of the sort we in Florida must have if
we are to meet the challenges facing us and realize our boundless opportunities.”118
Collins saw “no limit to Florida’s tourist and other possibilities” and was “determined
that we shall have the kind of roads and the kind of government in other ways that will
enable us to realize our boundless opportunities.”119 The Skyway, a symbolic milestone,
exemplified the forward-thinking approach to engineering and financing that would guide
the creation of a state turnpike. Months before his inauguration, Collins took up the reins
and rushed the turnpike into motion.
Before Collins was elected, the state had some general ideas of where a turnpike
might be built. In the early 1950s, state officials contemplated an east coast route, from
Jacksonville to Miami, or an inland route, serving “the great agricultural areas of the
Everglades and Central Florida.” Either route would provide a link to Tampa Bay. 120
The central route would be less expensive to build, passing through “low priced farmgrove and pasture land” while still being within range of major cities.121
Rather than build the entire highway at once, successive road departments
endeavored first to construct a limited-access highway along the southeast coast from
Stuart to Miami, an area in need of “traffic relief at the earliest possible moment,” and to
build the extension to Georgia later. The first segment became known as the ‘bobtail,’ a
somewhat denigrating term referring to the 108-mile-long highway’s shortness and
inadequacy to the state’s overall needs.122
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The Collins administration inherited plans for the bobtail, but they needed much
revision. Sam Turnbull reported to Thomas Manuel that out of eighty planned structures,
only fourteen were salvageable, mainly because they were the only ones to adhere to a
standard road width of twenty-eight feet.123 New plans were quickly drawn.
The decisiveness of the Collins administration rested on the time-tested expertise
of a number of consultants from around the country. On the twenty-third floor of 120
Wall Street, reinstated road department officials Sam Turnbull and Thomas Manuel met
with Sam P. Brown of Coverdale and Colpitts, the firm producing the turnpike’s traffic
and earnings report. Also present was R.N. Bergendoff of Howard, Needles, Tammen
and Bergendoff, whose firm was drafting the engineering report miles away in Kansas
City, in close concurrence with Coverdale and Colpitts’s earnings report. As of
November of 1954, a few kinks still had to be worked out. The routing was not quite
settled; Coverdale and Colpitts needed assurance that the Florida legislature would
rescind a decision to convert Route 9 north of Hollywood Boulevard into a limited
access, and therefore competitive, highway; and the consulting firm also needed to know
before completing a revenue estimate that the turnpike’s restaurant facilities would be up
to par, their quality to be regulated by the state.124
As the year came to an end, Collins’s team made a last ditch effort to make slight
alterations to the route, but Brown waved them off in lieu of the timeline drawn up by
Manuel.125 By January 4, the route was to be fixed and construction costs estimated; then
a feasibility report and validation; on February 14, the advertising of bonds and
construction contracts; March 1, bonds sold and construction bids opened; and March 15,
groundbreaking.126
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As plans went into motion, the public became interested in the specifications of
the bobtail. “Isn’t that to be a parkway as superhighways are in the north,” not unlike “the
beautiful one on Long Island,” a Yankee asked of Collins. “You will remember that
there are only occasional gasoline stations.”127 Presumably, most travelers would be
pleased with the limited access aspects of the bobtail.
On the other hand, a local industry of restaurants, filling stations, and tourist
attractions had grown up around the traditional highway. With a little ingenuity, a
determined entrepreneur of modest means could stake a claim on the roadside and have a
decent chance of making a living, if not striking it rich. What would become of the
concession industry when the fastest, most convenient route to Miami consisted of a
minimum of exits, with real estate and contracts going to the highest bidders? Noting
that 9,938 gasoline retailers had established themselves in the state, a representative of
the Allied Gasoline Retailers Association of Florida wrote Collins with a novel idea:
Don’t create any service stations along the thoroughfare, but rather provide access to the
towns where these establishments already existed. He added: “[T]here are ample
facilities for all needs in the cities and towns along the state’s thoroughfares; . . . if a
motorist should need gasoline, the same as he might need repairs to his car or a place for
his night’s lodging, he should obtain these necessary accommodations where they are
already provided – off the turnpike.”128
Consultants of national standing rejected the notion that traditional, small-scale
establishments would have any part in creating the modern facilities. One went so far as
to say that “the most successful operation of service facilities is where one operating
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company is charged with the responsibility of selling gasoline and oil, food, repairs,
communications, medical service and even policing.”129
Ultimately, the quality of Florida’s turnpike facilities was outlined in New York,
Chicago, and Kansas City. In November 1954, the state informed prospective bidders that
concessions along the bobtail would consist of three service stations. It was “a terrible
blow to small operators,” lamented the oilman. As for food, there would initially be
perhaps only one restaurant on the entire bobtail, perhaps more if the cost could be kept
under a million dollars.130 Hot Shoppes eventually won the contract.
Engineers and financiers of the nation’s highway industry took note of Collins’s
ability to coordinate operations. Letters with attached brochures flowed in, informing the
governor of what industry experts had done in the past, and what they could do for
Florida. Wallace G. Rouse, the same consultant who recommended one operation to
manage all facilities, aggressively entreated the governor to relinquish authority to him
on future programs. The problem with Florida, said Rouse, was that there were “too
many unqualified persons involved in a situation that requires a highly-specialized
knowledge.” “In the field of turnpike operations,” said Rouse, “we are not obliged under
any circumstances to bow to any authority.” As an adviser to the National Association of
State Turnpike Authorities, Rouse played a role in establishing “the standards by which
any well-informed turnpike authority should operate,” and he was ready to share his
already drawn plans for Florida. Convinced that the bobtail was not “practical or feasible
from a banking point of view,” Rouse pushed Collins to gear the legislature for a fulllength turnpike and coordinate with a Georgia pike while he took care of the rest.131
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Apparently, Collins preferred dealing with experts with a softer, gentler approach
than Rouse. Paul D. Speer of H.C. Speer and Sons Company of Chicago claimed to have
an excellent grasp on the coordination of the financial, engineering, and legal aspects of a
major project. Speer assisted with finances on the Skyway as well as the bobtail.
Whereas Rouse wanted to dictate, Speer offered to provide expertise where it was
needed. “The members of our councils, commissions and other governing bodies,” said
his brochure, “have the duty of seeing that governmental policies reflect the desires and
best interest of the public in general, and they are not expected to be experts in municipal
finance.” The responsibility of a municipal finance consultant, said Speer, was “not only
to save all the cost of his services for his clients, but should save those costs many, many
times over.” Speaking logically, rather than forcefully, Speer explained: “With bond
issues running for periods of twenty, thirty or forty years, a mistake causing only a slight
difference in interest rate can result in a tremendous difference in total cost over the life
of the bonds. On a twenty year issue of $1,000,000, one-quarter of one percent per year
comes to a total of $50,000.”132
N.C. Hamilton of Smith, Barney & Company also pursued business in a friendlier
manner, meeting Collins’s assistant Joseph Grotegut face-to-face and expressing interest
in the shaping of the governor’s road board and turnpike authority. Spun off from a
banking concern dating back to the Civil War, Smith & Barney offered “a background of
long experience and high traditions in the financial world with extensive modern facilities
and national scope,” claiming to be “one of the few firms that offers all-embracing
financial services as underwriters, brokers, and dealers in investment securities.” Smith &
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Barney also had a history with Florida, assisting with revenue on the Jacksonville
Expressway.133
Turnpikes were sprouting up all throughout the east, and the outlines of a
countrywide network were beginning to emerge. Promoters envisioned express links
from New York to Chicago and from Chicago to Florida, and adjacent states began
coordinating links. On the path to Florida, Alabama was as strong a contender as
Georgia.134
Despite their growth, however, turnpikes were not as financially sound as was
hoped. Initially, it was assumed that once the states paid off their construction debts, the
tolls would be lifted, but this proved financially unsound. In Pennsylvania, the nation’s
most prosperous turnpike owed its success to three factors: no competing routes had yet
pierced the Alleghany Mountains; it was built on a railroad bed; and it received federal
assistance. As a result, in 1955 the Pennsylvania pike had the “lowest debt per mile of
any modern toll road.” Other toll roads without these advantages had only a “marginal”
chance for success, although the possibility of federal aid could assure survival.135
As Eisenhower broached the idea of federal aid for superhighways, initially
proposing $50 or $100 million, the committee designated to direct financing, headed by
Lucius D. Clay, toyed with the idea of providing financial assistance to toll roads – great
news for the turnpike industry.136
With the bobtail under construction, the Collins administration developed plans
for Florida’s turnpike extension to the Georgia border. In 1956, bonds for a full-length
turnpike were already validated and the state was ready to build. Fatefully, passage of
Eisenhower’s 1956 Interstate Act did not bode well for turnpikes. Instead of
46

compensating turnpikes, it promised a toll-free nationwide network. The announcement
rocked the turnpike industry to the core. Turnpike Authority Chairman Thomas Manuel
saw the writing on the wall, stating bluntly, “Any competing free road built to Interstate
standards is better than a toll because it is FREE – it is just that simple.”137
The federal program dwarfed the state’s wildest highway dreams: 1,100 miles of
interstate highway crisscrossing the state at a projected cost of $500 million. First on the
agenda was I-4, which by 1965 was to extend a total of 154 miles from St. Petersburg to
Daytona Beach, passing through Tampa and Orlando. I-10 would run across northern
Florida, from Jacksonville to the Alabama border and on to California. I-95 would enter
Florida from Georgia, pass through Jacksonville and terminate in Miami. I-75 was to
cover the 210 miles from Georgia to Tampa.138 With such an ambitious program, what
would be the fate of Florida’s turnpike?
Although Floridians generally favored free federal expressways, up until 1954 it
was widely assumed that turnpikes were the only feasible way a state such as Florida
could construct a superhighway – that is, through the issuance of bonds redeemed with
toll revenue. When in 1953 the Miami Chamber of Commerce resolved to “use every
available means to urge the people and government of the State of Florida” to construct a
superhighway to South Florida, it was the Chamber’s assumption that this would be
constructed as a “Toll Turnpike.”139 With funds from such sources as gasoline taxes
spreading thin, it appeared that the ‘pay-as-you-go’ method of funding alone could not
handle Florida’s transportation development. Imperative road projects such as the
Jacksonville expressway were soaking up available funds, such that the state did not have
anywhere near the amount of money it needed to keep up its existing road program and
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develop a new statewide project. It therefore seemed logical that any superhighway
would be “paid for by those who use it.”140 Although the toll philosophy had many
opponents, it quickly emerged among Florida’s political elite as the sole plausible means
of constructing a superhighway. Many other states were already embracing the toll
philosophy, and Florida’s boosters did not care to be left behind.141
Even with the inducement of 90 percent federal funding, Collins proclaimed that
the turnpike authority was ready to go ahead with the extension “just as soon as our
additional bonds could be properly marketed.”142 In January 1957, Collins dedicated the
first 108-mile bobtail section of the Sunshine State Parkway.143 Safe and convenient just
like the projected Interstate, the bobtail boasted a minimum of 725 feet of visibility
around curves, a 950-foot minimum of merging length, wide shoulders and a median.144
Collins was proud of the accomplishment, and admonished the state for merely “toying
with the idea of a turnpike for the past 17 years at least,” as well as the 1953 legislature
for only authorizing a highway of bobtail size, rather than a “full-length turnpike.”
Fortunately, the 1955 legislature “saw the mistake” and called for lengthening the
turnpike from “north of Jacksonville” to the Gold Coast “with spurs to the Tampa Bay
area and West Florida,” but in the two years that the legislature wasted, the projected cost
of construction increased by $20 million.145 Now, with a federal program in the works,
Collins believed that the state should take advantage of both federal funding and tolls.
This was the time to build by any available means, not to yield the state’s highway future
to the interstate.
The bubble burst in the spring of 1957, when turnpike engineers confirmed that an
east coast interstate highway to Fort Pierce would jeopardize turnpike income, making
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the extension unfeasible. Collins conceded that the competing federal route created a
“tough hurdle,” but insisted that the engineers were wrong. The state’s needs demanded
going full steam ahead with both methods of funding. In the end, he believed the
turnpike and interstate would complement each other, giving the state “a more complete
network of limited access highways.”146 Nevertheless, consultants warned that even the
bobtail, not to mention the extension, would experience trouble upon the opening of
southeast Florida’s federal superhighway. Coverdale & Colpitts warned that upon
completion, roughly in 1976, the competing federal highway would produce a
“substantial and gravely adverse effect on . . . traffic and toll revenues,” with estimated
revenue dropping as much as fifty percent.147
To protect bobtail revenue, Manuel struck an agreement with road department
chairman Wilbur E. Jones, making the section of expressway paralleling the bobtail the
last of the federal system to be built. Jones agreed, but with the stipulation that when
advertising the bonds for the extension, any prospectus should inform buyers of the east
coast interstate route.148
Towards the end of Collins’s term, Coverdale & Colpitts at last felt that with the
financial success of the bobtail, the state could cautiously move forward with the
extension. The bobtail had not generated quite as much money as consultants hoped –
with the exception of toll roads in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, no turnpike ever did –
but high construction estimates “set the scales right.”149 Besides, the state had a plan. As
I-95 and I-4 entered the planning and construction stages, the turnpike authority
coordinated with the state road department in the planning of interstate construction. If
the road department sped the construction of I-95 from Georgia to Daytona, along with I49

4 from Daytona to Orlando, then motorists could be induced to take the extended
turnpike from Orlando to Miami – at least until 1975. With this in mind, it was argued as
late as June of 1960 that Collins could initiate construction on the extension. This was
preferable to seeing “the new administration immediately do what we know we can
accomplish now, thus bringing criticism on the present Turnpike Board for its
inaction.”150
As time went by, it became evident that the extension would be constructed by
Collins’s successor, not him. However, there was still hope that the bonds could be
validated and sold during Collins’s term, such that the next governor could “let contracts
left and right” as soon as he took office.151 As Farris Bryant emerged as the frontrunner,
Collins entreated him to “make a careful analysis of everything our Turnpike Authority
has done in seeking to develop an extension from Fort Pierce to Orlando,” and to see if he
would like to follow the same course. Collins was anxious to know Bryant’s position,
because a “group of antagonists” was organizing legal opposition to the extension, and to
move forward, Collins faced a “legal battle” and a “public relations battle” along with an
“all-out effort to get the bonds validated.” Collins was ready for the fight, but he and his
financial advisers needed to be assured that his efforts would “not prove futile” due to
Bryant changing course.152
Talks with Bryant proved disappointing. A number of disagreements stemmed
from a central matter of financing. The bobtail had been financed by $74 million in bond
sales sold at an annual interest rate of 3¼ percent. After completing the bobtail, the
fiscally responsible turnpike authority managed to buy back nearly $8 million worth of
bonds, reducing the debt to $66 million. Financial advisers approached Collins with the
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idea of refinancing the existing bonds to generate capital for the extension; but while
Collins saw a few advantages to refinancing, he ultimately rejected the plan. With
competing interstate routes, the best Florida hope for was a 4¾ percent interest rate on a
new bond issue. The added 1½ percent interest on refinanced bobtail bonds would cost
the state extra, nearly $9 million. Terms cited in the trust agreement would cost the state
another $10.2 million, for a total additional cost of nearly $19 million.153
Bryant nevertheless favored refinancing. In refinancing, Bryant sought to free
interstate construction from restrictions under the existing contract. Collins also
considered this, but pointed out that any refinancing plan would doubtless include the
same restrictions – for good reason. Ironically, although Collins generally favored urban
expressways over rural, and although Bryant’s record indicated the opposite, the bobtail
compelled Collins to put the brakes on federal urban expressway construction where it
was most needed, in southeast Florida, while Bryant apparently was ready to go forward.
Bryant also thought that refinancing might help speed the turnpike’s current litigation;
however, according to Collins, the litigation had nothing to do with financing, but with
routing, and therefore the litigants would not likely be “assuaged” by refinancing.154
Having outlined his case against refinancing, Collins sensed that Bryant had made
up his mind and therefore decided to “leave the matter now for you to . . . work out in
accordance with your own evaluations.” Collins, who touted his turnpike administration
as “one of the best in the country and one that has a fiscal soundness that is the envy of
toll facility administrators throughout the land,” offered to assist but would proceed no
further “with the plan . . . which you find you cannot approve.”155
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As to what advantages financial advisers saw in refinancing, and why Bryant
adopted the plan, I have not been able to ascertain. Bryant’s campaign assistant, John
Hammer, whom Bryant later appointed turnpike chairman, was apparently willing to
accept Collins’s judgment, but was not of the same character as his predecessor, Thomas
Manuel; on matters big and small, Hammer relinquished authority to Bryant, who was
more authoritative than his predecessor on turnpike matters.156
Through 1961, while construction surveys commenced on the extension route,
Bryant conferred with financial advisers. In June of 1961, Jerome Tripp, president of the
turnpike’s financial consultant, Tripp & Co., assuaged Bryant’s fears in reference to a
bond estimate: “Please do not be concerned if some of the preliminary figures […] are
not altogether pleasing.”157 Later that month, more bad news: President Kennedy
successfully pushed Congress to get the interstate program back on track. Where
turnpike consultants based their estimates upon the system being completed no sooner
than 1975, Kennedy brought the target date back to 1972. Predicting trouble, Manuel
tried to convince Hammer to cut his losses. “God knows that I’d like to see it built to the
Georgia line,” said Manuel; but: “The larger the bond issue – the harder to sell. The
longer the road – the more it will cost.” Orlando was a safe bet, but if the turnpike was
too ambitious, it might reach “the point of no return.”158
The conflict came to the attention of Bryant’s staff in December of 1960 during
meetings with Collins’ officials. W.R. Kidd, Bryant’s administrative assistant, noticed “a
very serious planning problem:” plans for Interstate 75 had been “prepared
independently” from the turnpike, “with no thought as to its possible effect.” “You will
note that in the vicinity of Ocala the Turnpike and the Interstate system parallel each
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other for a considerable distance. This is a situation that indicates either a total lack of
planning or absolutely no coordination between the two projects. It would not be
economically feasible.” 159
Aware of the potentially vexing interactions of federal and state governments,
Kidd warned Bryant, “it is sometimes extremely difficult to get the Federal Bureau of
Roads to make any changes to approved alignments.” This problem could “delay the
construction of the Orlando extension.” Kidd continued, “You can see the situation that
is rapidly developing. The Interstate system from the Georgia line to Alachua is under
contract. The Authority is now considering the extension of the Turnpike to Orlando, and
possibly Leesburg. Yet, at the same time, no provision has been made for a connection
between the two systems and, as I pointed out before, we simply cannot afford parallel
expressways this close together.”160
Cognizant of the problem, Kidd offered a solution: “I do respectfully suggest that
you direct that the Interstate, Sunshine State Parkway, and the primary system be
coordinated at the State and Primary level. This will have to be done by someone who
has considerable authority to make decisions and I would suggest that possibly Mr.
Monohan might be the proper selection.”161
As Bryant and his administration responded to the situation, interstate advocates
watched with keen interest.
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Clash

C. Farris Bryant was born on July 26, 1914 in Ocala. His father was a farmer and
bookkeeper. Although “of modest means,” the Bryants had close connections to
Florida’s political elite, with Bryant’s uncle Ion Farris having served as Florida’s Speaker
of the House and in the Senate. After receiving his degree in Business Administration
from the University of Florida, and a law degree from Harvard in 1938, Bryant served as
an auditor in the State Comptroller’s office and then established a law practice in Ocala.
In 1942, Marion County elected him as State Representative, but his term was cut short
by World War II.162 In the Atlantic, Bryant commanded artillery aboard an oil tanker
sailing from Galveston, Texas, to Bristol, England, watching helplessly as U-boats sank
allies off the coast of Iceland. Later, Bryant staged mock training battles from Guam
Naval Station. After the war, Bryant returned home to resume his career in politics.163
As a state legislator representing Marion County, Bryant eventually favored the
turnpike through central Florida, although Floridians in general remained sharply divided
on whether they wanted the limited access highway. Understandably, roadside
enterprises such as gas stations, motels, and restaurants protested that they would lose
trade. Furthermore, some argued that a highway without traditional roadside businesses
could not be profitable.164 Amidst heated debates over highway financing, Bryant also
established himself as a believer in toll roads. “Toll roads are unpalatable,” Bryant
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conceded, amidst a flurry of pleas not to promote them, “but we’ll have them tomorrow,
not because we like them but because there is no other way to finance needed road
construction.”165
There are many plausible reasons why Bryant sided with the turnpike. He was
well connected with the turnpike promoters and knew how to work with them.
Meanwhile, although he was no stranger to the allure of federal highway funding, his
correspondence suggests impatience with the federal application process. In 1955, he
inquired to Chairman Wilbur E. Jones of the Florida Road Department as to why the state
would have to renegotiate a highway contract order to procure federal aid. Jones
patiently explained that federal engineers needed to approve the entire process, “the
specifications, the bids and the contracts,” before providing aid. Likewise, Bryant hoped
to procure federal aid for work already completed. However, federal statutes precluded
that option, as Regional District Engineer B.P. McWhorter informed the state: “where
contracts had already been executed,” the state “could do nothing to help get Federal
Aid” unless the state could “cancel out the contract and readvertise.” (Florida’s sole
exception to this rule was the Gandy Bridge.)166 Technicalities such as these discouraged
many politicians from relying heavily on the federal government for highway funding,
and Bryant was no exception. Instead, Bryant preferred dealing with the state turnpike
authority, where he was better connected and exercised more direct control of routing,
engineering, contracting, and financing decisions.
As previously discussed, even with the availability of federal funding, toll
financing proved impossible to shake. The bobtail was already under construction while
Congress debated Eisenhower’s initiative, and Collins was raring to see the realization of
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the full-length turnpike. As Collins was putting the pieces in place for the extension of
the Sunshine State Parkway, warning signs arose that the merging of the Parkway and the
Interstate, backed by diametrically opposed philosophies and interests, was not going to
be a simple matter.
The first sign of problems to come, with the simultaneous development of the
turnpike and interstate systems, arose as the turnpike authority built the first stretch of
highway from Stuart to Miami. Built within miles of a proposed federal route, interstate
interests fumed over the lost federal funding. The debacle churned up a plethora of
concerns for interstate interests both in Florida and around the nation. If state or private
organizations could build over proposed interstate routes, would they be compelled to
meet federal standards? Would their highways be adequate for national defense as well
as for everyday travel? Was the toll-free interstate system going to be peppered with
tolls? In the event of a national emergency, would these turnpikes exact tolls on the
United States armed forces, as would occur during the Cuban missile crisis?167
Needless to say, the federal government already had its work cut out in making
sure the interstate system was completed in a logical, uniform manner. Toll roads
presented formidable challenges to the system’s integrity. With prominent Floridians,
including Bryant, revving for turnpike construction, it was no foregone conclusion that
the state’s interstate system would be built according to the guidelines of the 1956 Act.
Were it realistic for Collins to believe that state and federal programs would be
seamlessly woven together without a hitch, that assumption would be shattered during the
Bryant administration.
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As Bryant emerged as the frontrunner in the 1960 election and Collins began
ceding authority to him, the new governor introduced an insular style of government that
some, especially Cramer, found off-putting. A relentless booster of highway matters and
now a powerful member of the public works committee, it did not take long for Cramer
to argue that Bryant was purposefully or mindlessly undermining Florida’s interstate
system. Portraying Bryant as a servant to selfish turnpike interests who wanted nothing
more than to rake profits off of tolls, the benevolent Cramer would leverage his authority
to create as many toll-free routes as possible while mitigating their disruption by tollways.
Regardless of how much substance there was to Cramer’s accusations, the toll
issue offered prime opportunities to garner support in his district and throughout the state
of Florida. After all, someone had to protect the interests of northern visitors, who could
never be sure what kind of highways they would be subjected to on the way to their
vacation destination. If anyone was going to soak Florida’s tourists, it was going to be
the South Florida tourist establishment, which did not want visitors complaining of
gouging by toll roads, gyp joints, and speed traps in North Florida, Georgia, and other
states to the north.
Rather than meekly submit to the Democratic establishment’s promotion of
turnpikes, Cramer urged the public to become aware of the dichotomy of toll roads verses
free roads, skeptical of the former, and optimistic that they had an ally strong enough to
protect them from being exploited by turnpike bondholders, some of whom did not have
in mind the best interests of the state. This simple agenda offered Cramer ample
opportunity to cast himself as the just minority squaring off against the entrenched
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squirarchy of his own state. He had an excellent grasp of the tools at his disposal,
effectively searching out his enemies, pinpointing their weaknesses, manipulating
evidence, organizing a formidable army of supporters, and bringing the opposition to its
knees.
In the toll versus Interstate highway question, Cramer insisted on taking
advantage of federal funding while making Florida’s roads user-friendly. Key to
Cramer’s efforts was an intimate knowledge of the 1956 Interstate Highway and Defense
Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act. His congressional career literally grew up with
the legislation, and even as Congress and the presidency passed on to the Democratic
Party, Democrats with opposing road development philosophies would find a powerful
foe in Cramer and his allies. Knowing his limitations, Cramer also made valuable friends
among knowledgeable road officials. One of these was Clifton W. Enfield, Republican
Counsel for the Bureau of Public Roads, whose knowledge and expertise came in handy
as Cramer endeavored to protect Florida’s interstate system from being compromised by
toll roads.
Quick to remind Floridians of the mileage lost from Stuart to Miami, Cramer
sounded the alarm as the state extended the Sunshine State Parkway from the bobtail up
through central Florida. Problems with this development were numerous. First, the
Parkway might render Interstate 95 along the entire southeast coast of Florida
unnecessary. As Clifton Enfield pointed out, in 1956 the Secretary of Commerce had
issued a statement regarding toll roads along interstate routes that had become a maxim:
“There is no intention whatever of building any Interstate routes paralleling a toll road
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which until 1975 will adequately serve the traffic needs of the area through which it
runs.”168
Based on this mandate, Enfield also presumed that “Interstate route 4 from
Daytona Beach to Orlando and that section of the Sunshine State Parkway . . . from
Orlando to Fort Pierce can adequately serve the traffic needs until 1975 between
Jacksonville to Miami.” Therefore, “a free section of Interstate route between Daytona
Beach and Fort Pierce would not be justified.” Interstate 95 south of Daytona could be
justified only if the Bureau of Public Roads conceded that Interstate 4 and the Parkway
could not serve South Florida’s industrial, commercial, residential, and defense
requirements. In other words, there had to be enough traffic to justify both routes, a tall
order. Enfield suggested that Florida “secure . . . a commitment from Public Roads that
construction of the proposed extension of the Sunshine State Parkway will not be a basis
for Public Roads withholding approval of construction projects on IS 95.”169
During the summer of 1961, Cramer launched a two-pronged highway campaign:
one to shape federal law and policy according to a more prudent design, and another to
make sure that those laws were enforced in his own state. To the congressman’s credit, it
took a great measure of finagling, pitting Cramer’s legal and political talents to those of
the opposition in its many forms. Due in large part to these coordinated efforts, he
carefully aligned himself on the side of law and common sense.
Cramer’s campaign depended largely on the support of concerned Floridians who
were directly affected by the expressway developments. One of Cramer’s local
informants in Central Florida was N.G. Sherouse, from Reddick. When it looked as
though the state government wanted to inordinately manipulate the interstate system,
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Sherouse paid close attention to the media, put notice on public officials that they were
under his close scrutiny, and brought relevant developments to the attention of Cramer.
According to Sherouse, the state desired “a shift” of I-75 to the east of Ocala to enable a
shorter link with the Sunshine State Parkway, and perhaps even to extend tolls on I-75 as
far north as Gainesville.170 In a vitriolic press release, Cramer interpreted the I-75
situation: “The Bryant Administration’s original proposal for the Toll Parkway
extension, according to the Bureau of Public Roads, was to insert a 77-mile toll road on
Interstate 75 between Alachua and Wildwood. This highway, serving the West Coast of
Florida, is a proposed freeway paid for […] by the public out of road user taxes including
a 4 cent per gallon gasoline tax. Had this initial plan been approved, a $30 million loss in
Federal matching funds to the State of Florida would have resulted – and a toll facility
would have been injected on a freeway according to the Bureau of Public Roads in
testimony before the Highway Investigating Committee.”171
Sherouse considered it a victory when Bryant seemed to have “thrown in the
sponge” on rerouting I-75, sighing stoically when “stuck with a diversion” of US 441
“away from the original route south from Orange Lake to Ocala.”172 In return for
Sherouse’s cooperation, Cramer thanked him, urged him to attend the upcoming Road
Bureau meetings, and emphasized their purpose to “not sacrifice our free system in an
effort to build the toll facility.” At this hearing, Cramer hoped to smoke out Bryant’s
intentions for I-75 out into the open and force him to publicly seek advisement from the
Bureau as to whether the construction of I-95 would be affected by the Sunshine
Parkway.173 Cramer argued that the turnpike would have a devastating effect on I-95,
“the result of which is a loss of 135 miles of Interstate allocations from the Federal
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Government.” “This ridiculous scheme,” said Cramer, “will result in Florida’s losing
between $60 and $75 million in Federal apportionments, substitute a toll road in place of
a programmed free road from Daytona Beach to Fort Pierce and make indirect, a
previously scheduled direct route along the East Coast from Jacksonville to Miami.”174
For the Bureau meeting regarding Interstate 95, Cramer supplied Sherouse with a copy of
embarrassing State Committee hearings “which substantiate my initial charge that there
was an intention of inserting a toll section into Interstate 75. This, of course, has been
denied by the Governor and apparently the plan has now become abandoned.”175
While using public pressure to compel the governor to shed light on his
intentions, Cramer publicly extended an offer of assistance to lend his expertise “in
getting clearance, from the Bureau of Public Roads, for Florida’s free Interstate System
between Fort Pierce and Daytona Beach.” Cramer suggested Bryant “make a request . . .
asking for an unequivocal commitment from the Bureau that Florida’s free highway
system will not be jeopardized by the tollway.” The end of this seemingly conciliatory
press release ended with a sharp reminder of “Bryant’s charge of ‘politics’ – which
Cramer sweeps aside with his assertion that he only wants to help Bryant’s
Administration avoid the previous mistakes of the Collin’s [sic] Administration when
some $20 million was lost by integrating 44 miles of the Turnpike into the Interstate
System.”176
While Cramer battled Bryant at home, he also negotiated favorable policies in
Washington. Sensitive to the desires of road users who expected uniform standards on
federal highways, he initially forwarded their complaints to the authorities at the Bureau
of Public Roads. However, many Bureau officials believed that the incorporation of toll
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roads into the interstate system would speed its completion and was therefore justified.
Commissioner Ellis L. Armstrong, for example, maintained that although the fusion of
toll roads and free roads “may seem illogical to the individual road user,” “there is an
overall benefit in that available funds are diverted to the development of the Interstate
highway elsewhere,” making possible “a greater mileage of the Interstate System in a
shorter period of time.”177 Though it may not have seemed in the best interests of most
Americans, states maintained the right to build toll roads wherever they pleased, and it
was beyond federal jurisdiction to prevent their construction even where they overlapped
with the interstate. Cramer therefore had to spend a great deal of time rectifying federal
highway policies and the opinions of officials in order to keep the interstate system tollfree.
Cramer brought the issue to the national stage when, on August 21, 1961, he
proposed legislation to the House Roads Subcommittee that he hoped would settle the I95 question. Expressing in unflattering terms the state’s intentions to sidestep federal
policy and thus jeopardize I-95, Cramer pointed out that in previous years the Bureau had
revoked existing interstate routes due to the construction of nearby toll roads, resulting in
losses of $92 million in Massachusetts, $65 million in Kansas, and $36 million in Texas.
The Bureau also had a history of delaying construction “until it is clearly demonstrated
that the toll road cannot carry the traffic and the construction will not jeopardize toll road
bonds.” Was it justifiable to build two parallel routes to southern Florida? With
Congress for the first time in a position to halt the construction of a toll road before
allowing it to disrupt an interstate highway, Cramer saw this as a “unique opportunity”

62

for Congress to conduct a thorough inquiry before Florida “is inextricably committed to a
toll road program.”178
Cramer introduced two bills in that congressional session: one that would require
Congress to approve the designation of toll roads as part of the interstate system, the
other to preserve I-95 between Fort Pierce and Daytona Beach. Although neither bill was
enacted, Cramer later claimed that “the hearings served to pinpoint problems which exist,
not only in Florida but in many other states as well, regarding the relationship between
toll facilities and the Federal-aid highway systems.” 179 “Rather than the Governor and
his road board acting in secrecy,” reasoned Cramer, “a public hearing before the
committee would be required and the people interested and affected would know what’s
happening with their tax dollar and their highway future.”180
While behind the scenes Cramer endeavored to flush out an “unequivocal”
statement from the Bureau or proceed with congressional action regarding the routing of
I-95 alongside the turnpike, he reminded Bryant and the Florida public that he was as
capable as anyone at brokering an agreement amenable to the interests of the turnpike.
“I volunteer my assistance,” Cramer wired Bryant and Hammer on August 23, “in
attempting to get a favorable unequivocal commitment from the Bureau preserving
Florida’s free system and at the same time making it possible to build the Turnpike
without adversely affecting the interstate system.” With the welfare of the Florida public
at stake, Cramer demonstrated that it was the governor’s duty to present the turnpike
plans over to the Bureau for hearings.181 One of Cramer’s proposals to the Governor was
to “float advance construction bonds guaranteed by future Federal allotments, thereby
assuring a free system by 1972 rather than a network of tollways.”182
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On September 15, the St. Petersburg Times outlined possible snags in the turnpike
contract itself. Even if the Bureau allowed for a competing road, the turnpike
bondholders might not. The contract stated that any highway proven “materially
competitive with any part of the turnpike system” could result in a renegotiation of the
contract based on lost earnings to the competitive highway. John Fowler, vice president
of the New York bonding house Dillon, Read and Company, believed I-95 would
compromise the turnpike’s earnings. Based on projections of I-95 being completed in
1972, turnpike revenues would decrease from $17 million $12 million, annually.
Although with this $5 million loss there would still be enough revenue to pay off the
debt, such a loss would not sit well with bondholders.183
Cramer adapted the same set of facts into a strategic power play, asking, “how can
[Turnpike Chairman John] Hammer in one breath say that Interstate 95 and the Turnpike
are not competitive and in the next breath reveal that over 30 percent of the revenue on
the Turnpike will be lost once I-95 is completed and opened to traffic.” Fowler
meanwhile insisted that I-95 be delayed at least until 1973. Warning that it would be
within the bondholders’ rights to prohibit the state from constructing I-95 until 2001,
Cramer recommended that the state draft a new contract assuring that turnpike
bondholders would not object to I-95, rather than accepting Hammer’s assurances.
Again, Floridians could depend on nothing less than “Unequivocal clearance.”184
Where Cramer saw the Governor hedging on the option of deferring to federal
road officials, he went straight to the source, himself. If the Governor insisted on
building the turnpike, then he should have obtained unequivocal approval for I-95 from
the Bureau of Public Roads and from turnpike bondholders. If the State “can force a
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change of policy in the form of an unequivocal commitment as a result of my criticism,
then my purpose . . . will be accomplished.” However, Cramer had serious doubts that
such a policy change would be made. After conferring with Federal Highway
Administrator Rex Whitton as well as Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer for the
Bureau of Public Roads Frank Turner, Cramer was unable to obtain a “definite
commitment.” Cramer concluded, “the state’s approach – at best – is risky business. . . .
[T]he bond peddlers will be deciding the highway future of Florida.”185
–––
In the end, Interstate 75 was linked to Tampa without tolls, and the Sunshine
Parkway was linked to I-75 at Wildwood. This episode, however, did not end Cramer’s
crusade to protect the interstate system from turnpikes. At the end of the 89th Session of
Congress in 1966, Cramer boasted of having been “successful in helping to prevent the
construction of Interstate 95 in Georgia as a toll road connecting with Florida’s Interstate
as had been considered by some officials in Georgia.”186
Besides the issues described above, the infusion of private tollways with the
interstate system yielded further obstacles to a complete, smoothly operating system. On
February 23, 1966, Cramer noted in a speech to the American Road Builders’
Association that at the junction of the Sunshine State Parkway and Interstate 4, both the
federal government and the Turnpike Authority yielded to laws, contractual agreements,
and financial studies which precluded the construction of a connecting interchange from
one expressway to the other. Whereas a “law concerning the use of Federal funds for
facilities that will serve only toll traffic” restricted federal construction of the necessary
ramps, the Turnpike Authority also demurred, since “the ramps do not meet economic
65

justification criteria which governs expenditure of its funds.” “As a result,” observed
Cramer, “travelers who wish to go from one highway to the other must use widely
separated interchanges and travel several miles over heavily congested city streets.” So
much for convenience, safety, and national defense. As fate would have it, “private
developments,” including “a proposed new Disneyland,” said Cramer, “led the turnpike
authority to decide recently than an interchange can be economically justified, and it is
planning now to construct one with its own funds – someday.”187
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Fruitcake

Immediately following the enactment of the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highway Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the programs proved
vulnerable to theft and fraud.188 Responding to widespread scandals, in the summer of
1957 the Bureau of Public Roads developed a Project Examination division “with the
specific responsibility of making reviews and investigations, on a ‘spot-check’ basis.”
Despite the Bureau’s efforts, the graft “substantially increased.” In September 1959, the
Subcommittee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program, dubbed the Blatnik Committee,
was created as a subcommittee of the Public Works Committee “to investigate the
highway program and act as a congressional ‘watchdog’ to protect the Federal
interest.”189 While the Kelly Committee unveiled Florida’s highway contracting
shenanigans for the world to see, the Blatnik Committee was doing the same on a
national scale. Cramer used his committee status to bring federal scrutiny to the timehonored manner in which engineers and contractors conducted business in Florida and
around the nation. He summed up the problem this way:
Any program which involves such tremendous sums of money and the
participation of so many thousands of people, is bound to be a temptation
to dishonest and unscrupulous persons who can find many opportunities to
profit at the expense of the public. . . . Before the creation of the special
Subcommittee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program, I was convinced that
the vast majority of the persons building our highways were honest,
competent, and dedicated to serving the public interest. However, the
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disclosures of the special subcommittee have made it abundantly clear that
fraud, graft, thievery, and incompetency are far more widespread, and
involve far more persons, than most of us would have suspected or
believed.190
The first state highway department to undergo public subcommittee hearings was
Oklahoma. Cramer noted an “amazing picture . . . of inadequate or no supervision,
failure to make proper tests and inspections, falsifications;” in short, a “deplorable failure
to meet specifications.” Disclosures in other states also proved “shocking.” Florida was
no exception:
In our own State of Florida it was shown that over the years many of the
big highway contractors have been making payments of cash, whisky,
turkeys, and other merchandise of substantial value to officials and
employees of the State road department who were, of course, paid by the
State to see that these same contractors complied with specifications. The
Florida hearings have also shown that due to inadequate planning and
worse, the State has disposed of valuable improvements on rights-of-way
in total disregard of the public interest and has allowed the contractors and
speculators to reap windfall profits that should have been realized by the
State, a system that has permitted some contractors to use these valuable
assets for what might be euphemistically called payola to grease the palms
of two city commissioners and at least one highway official.191
A comprehensive study of kickbacks and graft in Florida’s road development
history might well trace it to the first paved paths. To Cramer, as with many other
proponents of the interstate program, the highway question was more than just a question
of civic and economic development. Taking seriously the concept of interstate highways
as a national defense system, corrupt practices in America’s highway development were
practically, if not literally, tantamount to breaches in national security. In the early
1960s, as Cramer rose through the ranks of Congress to become the ranking Republican
on the Blatnik committee and the roads subcommittee, and later the public works
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committee, he distinguished himself in his efforts to develop strong laws that would bring
accountability to federal road projects and stiff penalties to transgressors.
Developing these laws was not a simple task. For years, it appears to have
absorbed the legal talents of Cramer and his colleagues. Just how successful Cramer and
other watchdogs were remains to be assessed; but it seems that by the end of 1963, the
congressman contented himself with his accomplishments in this arena and essentially
gave up on what he could not push through that year.
In 1961, Cramer truly came into his own as a public works legislator, making the
first of a series of concerted efforts to tighten up federal highway construction laws by
drafting a bill that would make a federal crime the “indirect financing of primaries and
elections out of Federal funds appropriated for highways, to prohibit certain improper and
undesirable practices relating to the Federal-aid highway program, and for other purposes
designed to protect the public interest and investment therein.” The proposal threatened
fines up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment to any “officer, agent, or employee of the
United States, or of any State or territory or political subdivision thereof, or whoever,
whether a person, association, firm, or corporation” caught issuing false statements,
offering or accepting kickbacks, or benefiting from a conflict of interest.192 Named the
Federal-Aid Highway Reform Act, Cramer’s legislation “added several new provisions to
the law and amended some portions of existing law and would . . . greatly strengthen the
Federal law enforcement agencies in their efforts to prevent frauds and abuses and to
punish such actions when they are detected.”193
The above bill, like many of Cramer’s bills, brought with it a partisan intent. It
was the first of a series of such bills Cramer would propose, most if not all of which
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would be voted down by the Democrat-controlled congress, although many of the
measures in his bills would eventually be adopted. Due to countless instances of
incompetence, ignorance, selfishness, conspiracy, or just the unquestioned towing of the
party line, the Democratic Party alone could not be entrusted to enact laws to ensure the
successful execution of the national highway program. With Democrats in control of the
executive and legislative branches of government, Cramer cast himself into the role of the
just minority seeking to introduce law and common sense into highway governance.
One state indicted by Republicans to have some of the most notorious road
scandals was none other than President Kennedy’s home state of Massachusetts. Charges
issued by the Republican members of the public works committee included “kickbacks,”
“political contributions, conspiracy between some state highway officials, contractors and
engineering consultants that have resulted in inflated highway costs, political favoritism,
and conspiracy to cheat the government through the use of over-runs, inflated ‘winter
work’ bonuses, payments for work not actually done, and other techniques of fraud which
can easily be accomplished.”194
Corruption in Massachusetts’s road development richly earned a national
reputation. In August 1960, the Bureau of Public Roads submitted the Beasley and
Beasley report on corruption in Massachusetts. In March 1961, Atlantic magazine
published “Dirty Money in Boston,” which described the case of Thomas Worcester,
caught evading hundreds of thousands in income taxes and bribing public officials, the
latter offense Worcester considering an “‘ordinary and necessary’ cost of doing
consulting business with the Massachusetts Department of Public Works.” On June 19,
20, and 21, the New York Times followed up with front-page stories.195
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With Massachusetts making headlines, the case of Worcester seemed to the
Republican public works members to provide “a logical starting point for a thorough
investigation.” However, the Democrats who dominated the committee refused to
conduct a proper investigation. “Apparently everyone can find wrongdoing in
Massachusetts,” chided the Republicans, “except [the Blatnik Committee] and its expert
staff.” Accusing the Democrats of “an obvious whitewash” and a “party line refusal to
adequately staff the Massachusetts investigation,” Cramer and Minority Counsel Robert
E. Manuel did some investigating of their own, finding in Massachusetts a mere
“skeleton force” of investigators “operating under directions dictated by the Democrat
majority, which limit them solely to real estate appraisals which have largely already
been investigated by the Bureau of Public Roads.” More “foot dragging” on the part of
Democrats included the removal of a “U.S. Attorney who was seeking indictments by the
Grand Jury in the federal court” and the delaying of a “simple executive order authorizing
an inspection by the subcommittee of the income tax returns of persons suspected of
fraud and bribe-taking.”196
In lieu of the “deliberate refusal” of the subcommittee to “do its plain duty,” the
“result of direct orders from the top Democratic party leadership,” Cramer and fellow
republicans endeavored to enact the “duties and obligations that must be carried out as
Members of Congress” by calling for a “full and exhaustive investigation.” Even though
a similar motion had already been voted down, the Republicans hoped to “establish for
the record the manner in which the dictatorial majority is manipulating important
committees of Congress to accommodate their own narrow political interest, at the
expense of both truth and the public interest, and to register our determination not to be
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accessories either before or after the fact to practices that threaten to subvert the very
committee system of Congress and many cherished concepts of representative
government.”197
Eventually, the Democrats on the Blatnik Committee came around to the minority
view, and when they did, Florida was on their investigative list. Democrats concurred
that since 1956, Florida manifested “a sustained disregard for the public interest and has
eschewed the adoption of measures necessary for the proper protection and conservation
of [federal and state] funds.” The Democrats also condemned “a long-standing practice
in Florida by which some road builders paid unauthorized money and other valuable
merchandise to many State supervisory employees under circumstances which bordered
on bribery and extortion.”198
Republicans agreed with the democrats, but they wanted more forthright action to
institute responsible government in Florida’s federal highways. Each candidate for
governor was promising “extravagant highway millenniums” but delivered only “crash”
construction programs. Governors were also appointing “partisans” to the state road
board, such as Governor Farris Bryant’s selection of Warren Cason, a relative by
marriage of the Cones, a prominent family in the construction business with over $30
million in state contracts. As a result, the Republicans argued, “highly technical
engineering decisions are often made by politicians, not by competent, experienced
personnel.”199
The Republicans supplemented this criticism with the testimony of W. C.
Peterson, a division engineer of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads who worked with the
Florida government. According to Peterson, disorganization, along with cronyism, was at
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the heart of the problem, largely because Florida “never entered into long-range
planning.” Florida’s road governance had “no continuity of personnel and therefore no
continuity of policy planning or programming.” Three chairmen of the roads board
served under Governor LeRoy Collins, each with “a different idea of how the highway
department ought to be run,” each “pressuring” Peterson “pretty hard to ‘get the show on
the road:’”200 Peterson claimed: “Every letting I can remember that we have had in
Florida is under pressure. There is always a pressure to get the plans in and I have never
known from one letting to the next what group of projects they are going to send over. It
is very difficult for me to operate that way.” 201
Cramer asked Peterson how long Florida gave him to complete the “required
engineering,” “right-of-way acquisition and so forth.” “Sometimes 3 days,” Peterson
responded, “sometimes. Only on very, very seldom occasions have we gotten a set of
plans as much as a week ahead of time or even 2 weeks ahead of time. I have never had
that experience in other states.”202 The minority report also pointed out how, during the
transition from one administration to the next, the work of the previous administration
could be laid to waste. In one instance, $6 million paid to consulting engineers during the
Collins administration was wasted due to an overhaul of plans under the Bryant
administration.203
As a result of poor planning and graft, the cost of constructing interstate highways
in Florida was among the highest in the South, with Florida paying $89,216 per mile;
Georgia was paying $67,355, and Oklahoma only $17,447.204 Cramer’s group
recommended “a number of local reforms and procedures suggested by the record and
consideration of which we urge upon the appropriate state authorities.” Republicans
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wanted to impose laws on how the state conducted business with federal funds. By this
time, Florida had responded with some minor reforms, but in the Republican opinion, it
was still not enough. The state legislature needed to do more to punish “the givers as
well as the receivers of largess.”205
To free the state road board from “the dead hand of partisan politics,” it needed
continuity of personnel, policy, and programming, rather than having all five members
appointed by each administration. Likewise, Republicans recommended the creation of a
highway administrator, isolated from gubernatorial politics. The road department, though
subject to the authority of the road board, was staffed with “able and dedicated people
who are overworked and underpaid,” and needed a respectable pay scale, job designation,
and a merit system to insulate it from politics.206 The properties management sector of
the roads department, characterized with “blunders and confusion,” brought attention to
the need for “reorganization under a single, coordinated authority,” rather than the
“hydra-headed monster which has long plagued the Interstate System.”207 Meanwhile,
the state needed to address its right-of-way acquisition laws, which permitted the state to
offer property owners five percent more than the market value and which taxed the state
with attorneys’ fees, leading to “protracted and costly litigation.”208
Amidst the cultural and political upheavals that took place in Florida during the
late 1950s and 1960s, the state initiated a series of investigations and reforms of its
transportation governance, culminating in the creation of the Department of
Transportation in 1969. Cramer played a prominent role in bringing problems to light
and offering solutions.
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As for Washington, the first executive department to accommodate the
Republican demand for stricter laws was the Department of Commerce, which had
authority over the Bureau of Public Roads and was “responsible for the administration of
the Federal-aid highway program.” Here, we have evidence of Cramer pushing, with
some success, to institute significant changes on national policy. In response to Cramer’s
1961 bill, the Department of Commerce began to acknowledge that the federal
government needed to play a stronger, more direct role in the state management of
federal funds. On March 15, 1962, the Under Secretary of Commerce congratulated the
“continuing investigation of the special subcommittee,” which had demonstrated that
national reforms were “a vitally necessary adjunct to present highway program
legislation.” Neither the existing highway statutes nor the authority of the Federal
Highway Administrator to withhold Federal-Aid funds had proven effective deterrents.209
In March 1962, the Commerce Department also initiated House Resolution 9353,
which was “somewhat similar” to what Cramer had proposed in 1961. Although, in lieu
of the Commerce Department’s bill, the Blatnik Committee conducted further
investigations in Massachusetts and West Virginia, Congress failed to enact legislation
based on the Committee’s findings. Persistent as ever, on January 24, 1963, Cramer
introduced a new bill “to revise and strengthen the Federal laws relating to offenses
committed in connection with the Federal-aid highway program.” Again, Cramer called
for stricter enforcement against “conflicts of interests, . . . false statements and
representations relating to the acquisition, administration and disposition of real property,
as well as the work, material and equipment,” and “political contributions . . . by any

75

person or firm who is at the same time negotiating for or performing a contract in
connection with a Federal-aid highway project.”210
Cramer sensed that the “kickbacks” measure would be the most controversial part
of the bill, so he provided some background to show that his proposal was not a major
departure from past precedents. Since 1940, federal law prohibited firms and individuals
with contracts with the United States from making political contributions. However,
because U.S. highway contracts were issued by individual states, the law did not extend
to federal highway programs, even if federal aid amounted to fifty to ninety percent of the
cost. “But if it’s bad to misuse Federal funds for political purposes at the Federal level,”
said Cramer, “it is equally bad at the State level.”211
The Boston Herald touted the “tough bill” drafted by the “minority leader of the
Blatnik committee.” Given the “mounting evidence” of “widespread cheating,” the
Herald predicted that although his previous bills were “sidetracked,” “some sections” of
this recent bill had “a better chance of passage during this session of Congress,” now that
the states’ “shenanigans . . . had time to sink in at the Capitol.” The measure prohibiting
political contributions was considered the “most far reaching,” but also had the “least
chance of passage.” After all, “politicians the country over depend heavily on contractors
for their campaign funds;” “most construction companies in the position to make
generous donations to political committees, are involved directly or indirectly in the
interstate road program.” The Herald noted that Massachusetts Governor Peabody’s
“very successful birthday dinner . . . was enriched considerably by contractors shelling
out $1,000-a-table.” “Campaign contributions,” the article concluded, “are a bread and
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butter issue with politicians and until someone can suggest a suitable alternate, Congress
is not likely to prohibit contractors from spreading their manna.”212
Cramer’s bill made headway as higher officials in the Kennedy Administration
began adopting some of his proposals. On April 4, 1963, Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy of the Department of Justice proposed jointly with the Department of
Commerce legislation “substantially similar” to Cramer’s, although weaker on conflicts
of interest (requiring full disclosure, but not instituting penalties) and without a
“provision prohibiting political contributions.”213 Later that month, Congressmen
Emanuel Celler and Jim Wright both introduced the administration’s softer bill.214
By the summer of 1963, Cramer had essentially thrown up his hands on
legislating penalties for conflicts-of-interest and political contributions relating to
federally funded highways. Having become astute observers of federal highway ethics,
he and his colleagues developed treatises on right-of-way acquisition and the thorny issue
of conflicts-of-interest, to be delivered to professionals in the federal highways business.
One of these talks was delivered to the New York Court of Claims School of Advanced
Study in Real Property Acquisition by the minority counsel for the roads subcommittee,
Clifton Enfield. The address dealt with the “complexities” faced by the “modern day
right-of-way agent,” who must be “25 percent appraiser, 25 percent salesman, 25 percent
engineer, 25 percent lawyer, 25 percent governmental administrator, 25 percent
economist, 25 percent public relations expert, and 25 percent psychologist . . . a doublesized man.” This detailed address suggests the level of compassion that Cramer and his
colleagues had developed for professionals in the road development industry, as well as a
detailed understanding of the challenges these professionals faced. The last thing these
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professionals could do was rest on their laurels. “The time has come,” Enfield
admonished his audience, “when members of the right-of-way profession, as well as all
others associated with the highway program, must be brutally objective and honest in the
evaluation of themselves and their associates. Those who are competent, honest, and
dedicated are a credit to the profession and an asset to the highway program. I am sure
that the great majority of persons engaged in right-of-way acquisition for the highway
program fall into this category. However, there are others who are neither a credit nor an
asset to anything.”215
Bad right-of-way agents fell into two categories: the dishonest agent and the
honest agent “who simply does not know how to do his job and hides the fact from his
superiors.” The former, prevalent in Massachusetts, could be restrained but not
eliminated. The latter, prevalent in West Virginia, simply had to be educated.216
Cramer’s last known address to Congress regarding his Federal-Aid Highway
Reform Act was delivered on August 23, 1963. His speech, “Conflict of Interest as a
Legal and Administrative Problem,” was drafted by another of his trusted advisers,
Robert L. May, minority counsel for the Blatnik Committee. May originally delivered
the address to a group of highway lawyers. As an “administrative problem,” May began,
conflicts of interest involve “questions of policy and practicality, as well as principles of
ethics and integrity.” As a “legal problem,” as Cramer and his colleagues well knew, “it
involves questions of the legal authority to regulate, valid means of regulation and
enforcement, and the rights of public officials as citizens, as well as technical problems of
drafting a clear, unambiguous regulation or statute.” The main difficulty in regulating
conflicts of interest was that it encompassed such a wide range of behavior that any
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general law “would probably be too vague to be enforceable.” As a result, convictions
were rare. After years of Blatnik Committee investigations, the same problems were
cropping up around the country, “a disturbing indication that administrative action . . . is
lagging.” 217
The President summed up the problem with existing laws. “The fundamental
defect of these statutes as presently written is that: On the one hand, they permit an
astonishing range of private interests and activities by public officials which are wholly
incompatible with the duties of public office; on the other hand, they create wholly
unnecessary obstacles to recruiting qualified people for Government service. This latter
deficiency is particularly serious in the case of consultants and other temporary
employees, and has been repeatedly recognized by Congress in its enactment of special
exemption statutes.” 218
Following a lengthy discussion on the efforts of the government to regulate
conflicts of interest, May presented, in further detail, the pending legislation presented by
Cramer, Wright, and Celler. All three bills barred contractors from giving to state
employees, prevented contractors from deviating from their contracts, and prohibited
false statements. Cramer’s bill stood alone in denying those engaged in federal highway
projects from making political contributions, and only his bill provided actual penalties
conflicts of interest cases.219 The address trailed off into general, philosophical questions
directed to lawyers. If these two documents were Cramer’s final effort to get his
legislation passed, then it was an uncharacteristically feeble effort. By the end of 1963,
Cramer’s attention had shifted to other issues.
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The deplorable condition of Florida’s interstate highways made the November 30,
1963 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. Page 19 shows a close-up of a Florida road
surface, textured everywhere with little grooves maybe an inch deep, with golf ball-sized
chunks of rubble strewn amidst the remnants of blown tires along the median. The state
had to build a dividing wall to prevent out-of-control cars from careening into oncoming
traffic.220 This was the surface of the W. Howard Frankland Bridge over Tampa Bay, at
the southwest terminus of Interstate Highway 4 – a bridge funded 90 percent by the
federal government and designed to link Pinellas County with the greatest road program
in American history, perhaps the history of the world. This boon to economic
development, this pillar of national defense, this was Florida’s monument to American
mobility. The original cost was $6.2 million. The 30-inch dividing wall cost another
$250,000. One of the span supports met minimum federal standards, but 39 others did
not. It was, said Congressman James Wright, “about as poorly constructed as any bridge
in the United States.”221 Congressional investigators discovered that project engineer Joe
R. Maseda, Jr., whose job was “enforcing specifications,” received “payola” from the
road surfacing contractor, Hardaway Contracting of Tampa. Though unethical, this was
not unusual. Similar activities were going on throughout Florida and in many other
states.
Florida’s shenanigans had their own signature. They were not the most sinister
(that would be Massachusetts), nor did they stem from the most ignorance (that
distinction went to West Virginia). The nature of Florida’s deviance was captured under
the heading: “PAYOLA INCLUDED CIGARETTES, WHISKEY, TURKEYS, HAMS, AND,
FRUITCAKES.”

Namely, state engineer William H. McLeod Jr. was caught collecting at
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least $10,000 in spirits, smokes, and vittles.222 On national television, McLeod proudly
stood his ground and proclaimed, “I can still live with myself. I can look back over and I
can look you or anybody else in the eye and tell you that I haven’t done anything wrong.
Only thing wrong I have done is possibly work too many hours and tried to do the right
thing about everything.”223 There was a well-established precedent for McLeod’s lack of
remorse. As President Julian L. Cone, Jr. of Cone Brothers Contracting Company put it,
payoffs to state engineers had been the norm for “as long as I have been in the
contracting business.”224
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Posies

Through the 1960s, the scope of Cramer’s political power expanded. Rising in
status to become the senior Republican on the House Public Works Committee, he used
the Interstate system to wedge himself into national policy debates. Despite differences
with public works Democrats, during the course of his highway reform years Cramer
developed a strong rapport and a good working relationship with them. He would also
recall in later years the bipartisan manner with which the Kennedy administration
approached transportation issues, a compliment he was not to extend to the Johnson
administration. In the mid-1960s, a new foe to the system would emerge, keeping Cramer
occupied for years. President Lyndon Johnson brought to the executive mansion
unbridled energy, an artistry of deal-making, and a solid party majority willing to spend
on the Great Society. When it came to highway matters, however, Cramer found
Johnson’s administration inconsistent and misguided. The only thing more
unconscionable to Cramer than cash, whisky, and turkeys was guns and butter. The
President, according to Cramer, made several steps to compromise the interstate system,
sometimes in an effort to boost his social programs, sometimes for no logical reason at
all. Cramer’s efforts garnered the attention of powerful Republicans such as Richard
Nixon, who during his presidency frequently met with Cramer and personally endorsed
the Floridian’s 1970 U.S. Senate campaign.
82

Of all of Johnson’s policies, that of beautifying highways using construction
funds provided the most convenient political target. “The Highway Beautification Act of
1965,” explained Cramer in 1966, “provides financing from the general funds of the
Treasury for the first 2 years for the control of advertising and junkyards adjacent to
Interstate and Federal-aid primary highways, and for landscaping and scenic
enhancement along all federal highways.” However, Johnson wanted to shift course,
proposing that the Highway Beautification Act “be financed from the highway trust fund,
at an average rate of more than $200 million a year for the Interstate System alone.” As a
result, Cramer warned, “all money spent for beautification would be taken away from
construction, and less miles of Federal-aid primary and secondary highways, and their
urban extensions, will be improved.” Johnson, Cramer concluded, “thinks it is more
important to beautify these roads than to construct them or to make them safe and
adequate for travel.”225
In 1967, Cramer was not finished with the beautification question. During a
February 6 speech, Cramer accused Johnson of a “turnabout on highway safety,” arguing,
“At the very same time that the administration is stopping badly needed highway
construction, it is calling for . . . $380 million of new obligational contract authority for
landscaping, billboard control, and screening of junkyards,” and “recommending that
from $1.8 to $2.9 billion be spent over the next 10 years to make the Federal-aid highway
system more beautiful.” “Should it not be made more safe first?” Cramer implored. “In
my opinion,” he continued, “the administration is placing a higher value on posies and
bushes along the highways than it is placing on American lives or on our use of highways
for national defense. It will be of no benefit to the man, woman, or child who dies in an
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automobile accident on an obsolete road to have enjoyed looking at posies before the
crash occurred.”226
Later that year, Cramer requested “1 long minute” from the House to discuss
Johnson’s inconsistent, almost amusing, stance on the beautification issue. Apparently,
while the Administration was calling for the elimination of 1,014,000 out of 1.1 million
roadside signs, it was also distributing information from the Small Business
Administration touting billboards as “a motel’s introduction to the greatest number of
potential guests.” “Thousands of owner-managers say their very existence depends
directly on the signs,” said the brochure. “Many motel operators find it to their
advantage to start their sign ‘campaign’ about 250 miles from the motel --- the average
day’s drive for most travelers. Average highway speed is about 50 miles an hour, so a
sign every 50 miles will remind travelers of your business once an hour. Your biggest
sign should be the last one, the one closest to your motel (even in sight of it).”227
In August 1967, when Cramer proposed legislation “to provide for eliminating or
minimizing roadside hazards,” he included as leading hazards “unnecessary signs […]
which can kill the motorists who run into them; and, certain highway beautification
‘improvements,’ such as the planting of trees.”228
Construction-versus-beautification was just one of many highway issues on which
Cramer distinguished himself from Johnson. Foremost on Cramer’s agenda was
preserving interstate funding and ensuring that enough funds would be available to keep
the project on schedule. A 1967 report to Congress drafted by Cramer and Clifton
Enfield summarized the progress of interstate funding up to that time. In 1956, to
provide for the “prompt and early completion of the National System of Interstate and
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Defense Highways,” Congress drafted the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Initially,
the Interstate was to be completed in fourteen years, or by 1970, but that deadline was
extended to 1972, or sixteen years. Thus, the Federal-Aid Highway Act called for sixteen
appropriations “for the purpose of expediting its construction.” 229
Hence, the federal government appeared braced for the project, but what about the
road construction industry? As a precaution, in 1956, the Public Works Committee
checked with the roadbuilding industry to ensure its ability to keep up with the
construction program. In response, the contracting industry expanded in order to meet its
obligations.230 Trusting that the federal government would be ready with needed funding,
“many construction firms substantially enlarged their professional and supervisory staffs,
expanded their office and other facilities, increased their work forces, and purchased
additional roadbuilding equipment.” Road contractors thus placed their trust in the
federal government to back them, even buying on credit or borrowing in faith that the
government would reimburse them.231 Cramer, for one, was determined not to let down a
road construction industry that had shown so much faith in the government.
At the beginning of Johnson’s presidency, the President seemed to share Cramer’s
understanding of the importance of highway funding. Claiming some credit for the
enactment of the 1956 Interstate and Defense Act, signed into law when he was Senate
Majority Leader, Johnson emphasized the benefits of the highway to the oft-neglected
highway driver as he signed into law the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1964. “For much
too long,” Johnson remarked,
the man who owns and drives an automobile has been treated like a
stepchild. We require him to pay for the highways he uses and we require
him to pay in advance. We divert his taxes to other uses but we delay the
85

building of the roads that he deserves. We denounce him for getting
snarled in traffic jams not of his own making. We complain about what he
costs us but we never thank him for what he adds to the worth and wealth
of our economy. We could not get along without him, but we often talk as
through [sic] we can’t live with him. . . . Eight years ago, in 1956, we set
out on a 16-year program to catch up with ourselves, catch up through the
Interstate Highway System. This has been described as the most
ambitious highway program since the days of ancient Rome. It was my
privilege then to guide that program to passage as Senate Majority Leader.
In every respect, it has met our hopes. It has put more than one million
Americans to work. It is already saving 3,000 lives a year and, by 1972, it
will be saving 8,000 lives a year. . . . It is saving dollars---$6 billion in
user benefits last year; $11 billion a year 8 years from now; and the
program is not costing the General Fund of the United States Treasury a
single cent. . . . I say that this morning because I want the American
motorist to know that things aren’t so bad that we must sell off our public
roads to the highest bidder for Uncle Sam to stay liquid.232
Besides omitting the relevance of the interstate system to the nation’s defense, the
above sentiments essentially mirrored those of Cramer throughout his congressional
career. Had Johnson held to this position, Cramer might have become an ally. Although
Cramer valued his party and sought victories for it wherever he could, highway
development was one issue where he was willing to put aside partisan politics if he
thought it would advance interstate highway financing and construction. In March 1965,
for example, Congressman John Kluczynski, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Roads of
the House Committee on Public Works, introduced a bill “to approve the estimate of cost
of completing, and to revise the authorization of appropriation for, the Interstate System.”
In return, Cramer reintroduced the same bill as a demonstration of “bipartisan support for
the interstate highway program.”233 Likewise, during the 1968 Florida Senate election,
Cramer and former Governor LeRoy Collins, a Democrat, found common ground on the
enduring Interstate versus Turnpike question. Edward Gurney, the Republican candidate,
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ran an Orlando law firm that represented the Turnpike Authority under Governor Claude
Kirk and, not surprisingly, came out in favor of the Turnpike.
In the years following 1964, Johnson strayed from his previous interstate
advocacy, slighting the highway user in the same manner that he previously denounced in
1964. Frequently, trusting Cramer’s testimony, Johnson quietly diverted highway funds,
although during at least one speech, given on November 29, 1966, Johnson openly
denigrated the interstate highway program to make way for his Great Society: “We
would rather postpone the construction of an office building or stretch out the completion
of a six-lane super-highway than to stop the momentum of our great programs for the
people that hold out a promise of hope and opportunity to so many.”234
Cramer was critical, to say the least, of Johnson’s method of scraping together
finances for Great Society programs by taking money from the interstate system. As
early as 1966, Cramer described Johnson as “devoid of leadership in providing funds to
complete the system by 1972.”235 In an address to the Road Builder’s Association on
February 28, 1966, Cramer claimed, “If necessary funds had been provided” in 1965, the
system could have been completed in 1972, “except for a few isolated projects in some
large metropolitan centers.” To complete the system on schedule would require “rapid
acceleration of construction, probably followed by a sudden deceleration,” rather than in
an “orderly and economic fashion.” At best, the system could be completed by 1973, and
without prompt action, not until 1975.236
The climax of Cramer’s anti-Johnson crusade came on February 6, 1967, when
the House yielded sixty minutes to Cramer to address how the Johnson Administration
was jeopardizing America’s highway program. According to Johnson, Cramer inferred,
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harking back to Johnson’s 1964 speech, America’s financial situation must actually have
gotten so bad that Johnson could justify “treating the American motorist like a stepchild,”
“diverting highway users’ taxes to other uses,” “perpetrating the plight of the motorist
who is ‘snarled in traffic jams not of his own making,” showing “utter disregard for the
fact that the Interstate System will be saving 8,000 lives a year upon completion,” and,
last but not least, using “every possible budget gimmick for ‘Uncle Sam to stay
liquid.’”237
Cramer relished quoting that last remark made by Johnson – “things aren’t so bad
that we must sell off our public roads to the highest bidder for Uncle Sam to stay liquid”
– citing it three times in a single speech. (Cramer cited the phrase again on October 11,
1967.) As for cutting highway funds to promote social programs, Cramer pointed out
that the interstate system itself served as an important social program: “What opportunity
or promise of hope have you given by the cutback to the thousands of people in the
construction industry who will become unemployed and to the contractors who will
become bankrupted? What better program is there to help the people than to construct
their highways as early as possible and save 8,000 lives a year?”238 Again, what poverty
program would “employ more people and keep the economy stronger than highway
construction, which requires thousands of taxpaying workers and millions of dollars in
heavy construction equipment and links areas contributing to our prosperity?”239
The theme arose again as Cramer discussed the potential for disaster to road
departments and building contractors in disrupting slated highway funding. “State
highway departments,” Cramer explained, “are large, complex organizations. Scheduling
of operations, which require advanced lead times, is essential for their efficiency and
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economy. Sudden changes, without notice, in the States [sic] construction programs by
the Federal Government disrupt work schedules and financing plans. They render useless
or lessen the usefulness of work previously accomplished. They result in additional costs
and work hardships upon the State highway departments. . . . Many highway
departments will have to either discharge personnel or reassign them to other
departments. Already States are reporting to the Representatives in Congress that
hundreds of field personnel are being laid off or reassigned.”240
As for contractors:
The sudden slowdown in the award of highway construction contracts is
most serious . . . Many contractors cannot long survive the Federal
Government’s turning the Federal-aid highway program off and on like a
faucet to suit its own purposes. The cutback has suddenly decreased
contractors’ workloads from the levels they had anticipated and geared up
for. Because of the cutback, contractors may have little or no new work to
commence as old jobs are completed. In such cases, some contractors
may be able to bear the costs of carrying surplus personnel and equipment
inventories, in the hope that the faucet soon will be turned on again.
Others must discharge employees and dispose of construction equipment.
If they are forced to discharge their supervisory and skilled personnel and
to dispose of their equipment, they will be unable to respond quickly when
the faucet is again turned on by the administration. Thus, urgently needed
highway improvement will be even further delayed. 241
Cramer thus emphasized that to compromise the interstate system to promote the
Great Society was completely irrational. By “asking for a 25-percent increase in
programs to relieve poverty,” the Johnson administration “instituted a highway cutback,
which will produce poverty. Hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of highway construction
workers will be laid off. The economy will lose hundreds of millions of dollars in
construction work. This does not make sense.” At the end of the hearing, Congressman
Cleveland went so far as to speculate that by destroying the highway industry, the
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Administration intended to “create new classes of poverty . . . so that they can have
objectives lined up for new poverty programs.” Cramer dismissed this conspiratorial
accusation, concluding instead that Johnson valued “poverty squandering” over “our
transportation lifelines” along with “defense, the national economy,” and “the fiber of our
society.” In contrast, Cramer believed highway construction to be an effective social
program in itself, better than any program Johnson brought to the table.242
Where Johnson lacked the authority to impose cuts in the interstate system, on at
least one occasion Cramer accused him of manipulating Congress to do so. The
accusation came on the heels of an announcement to the governors from Secretary of
Transportation Alan Boyd on October 8, 1967, informing them that due to “recent
Congressional discussion on substantial reductions in Federal expenditures, it may
become necessary to impose ceilings on the Federal-aid highway program.” On October
11, Cramer pounced, describing Boyd’s letter as “an obvious sledgehammer tactic to
bludgeon the Congress into passing the tax surcharges the President has recommended,
instead of reducing unnecessary Federal expenditures.” Cramer reminded Congress that
since the interstate system was funded “out of the Highway Trust Fund, not the general
fund,” its money raised from “highway user taxes,” the cut-back would have “no effect
whatsoever on the estimated expenditures in the administrative budget nor the deficit of
about $29 billion which the President has forecast.” Not only was the attempted raid on
highway funds “unwarranted,” it was thus also “unthinking.” Cramer then went on the
offensive, calling for a reduction in federal spending to the tune of $5 billion, pointing
out that Arkansas Democrat Wilbur Mills, the leader of the Committee on Ways and
Means, called for a “$7 to $10 billion reduction in Federal expenditures” before issuing a
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surtax. Among the programs Cramer wished to ax: “antipoverty, demonstration cities,
rent supplements, the Teacher Corps,” and, lastly, a highway beautification program
meant to acquire “land outside the highway right-of-way.” “It is a most peculiar set of
priorities,” puzzled Cramer, “which would dictate the expenditure of huge sums of
money for beautification and other cosmetic and luxury programs while we are facing a
$29 billion deficit, and while citizens of the United States are bleeding and dying in
Vietnam and on our inadequate highway system.” Cramer cited 53,000 traffic deaths in
1966, just short of the number of Americans killed in the entire Vietnam conflict.243
Cramer went on to describe how, under Johnson’s leadership, the financing of
federal highway projects had become “a yo-yo program of ups and downs.” In October
1966, the states thought they had $4.4 billion for 1968. In November, this figure
suddenly dropped by $1.1 billion, though in July of 1967 the figure returned to $4.4
billion. In August, 1967, the states were told they had $4.74 billion for 1969, but on
October 8, Secretary Boyd announced this could be cut in half. The program, Cramer
said, could not operate smoothly with such fluctuations: “An effective Federal-aid
highway program simply will not exist if it continues to go up and down like a yo-yo
with every fluctuation in the economic situation. Whether the proposed cutback is put
into effect or not, Secretary Boyd’s announcement that up to a 50-percent reduction is
being considered has already seriously damaged the highway program. . . . Uncertainty
as to what will happen in the highway program next week, next month, or next year has a
severely damaging impact.”
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With such uncertainty, the states would be more likely to lose faith in the program
and instead rely on dreaded toll facilities. That included Florida, which was facing a
possible 61 percent cutback for 1968.244
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Umbrella

Up to this point, I have emphasized Cramer’s gladiatorial spirit. However, it
would be misleading to say that he always picked his battles along partisan lines, or that
reelection was his prime motivation, or that the adversaries in his crosshairs were merely
expedient targets. Further testimony in the congressional record reveals that Cramer
mastered an encyclopedic working knowledge of the relationships between various
Congressional committees and of federal bureaucracies. After a brief scan of just a few
segments of his career, it is hard not to be impressed by his knowledge and forwardthinking approach to problems, nor to acknowledge the respect and deference that
Cramer garnered from his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Like a skilled chess
player, when drafting, amending, or criticizing legislation, he understood cause and
effect, foreseeing the far-reaching consequences of congressional action. Connected,
intuitive, and persuasive, his influence ranged far beyond the committees on which he
officially served.
Cramer’s ability is apparent during the fine-tuning of certain legislative acts
during 1966 and 1967. In 1966, House Resolution 13200 was circulating through
Congress, to establish a Department of Transportation, an umbrella organization
encompassing, among other agencies, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Bureau of Public
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Roads, and the Maritime Commission. On April 26, Cramer appeared before the
Committee on Government Operations to share his views and recommend amendments
drafted by the leader of the public works committee, George Hyde Fallon. While Cramer
agreed with the spirit of the legislation, that it was essential that “all Federal
transportation programs must be fully coordinated,” he questioned whether “the existing
transportation agencies and officials” would not be able to achieve the same goal. He
was also concerned that once subordinated, the lower agencies would “lose their
independence or semi-independence” and “be denied a major voice at the policy levels of
the Government.” The position of Federal Highway Administrator overseeing the Bureau
of Public Roads, for example, was to be erased or downgraded. With the “importance of
the Federal-aid Highway program . . . not diminished but . . . increased” since 1956,
Cramer contended, “this is certainly no time to downgrade the position of Federal
Highway Administrator.” Therefore, Cramer recommended that the administrator
position, along with the existing “four Assistant Secretaries and the General Counsel,” be
maintained at their present salary and status.245
The following year, Congressman James Colgate Cleveland of New Hampshire,
an ally of Cramer’s, confirmed that with the creation of the Department of
Transportation, “the Bureau of Public Roads has been almost completely eviscerated. . . .
The field offices and personnel of the Bureau of Public Roads are no longer responsible
to the Director of Public Roads. . . . [T]he Director of Public Roads is no longer in the
chain of command; . . . has no supervision or control over the officials exercising
authority delegated by him.” The range of the Bureau’s actual “Supervision and control”
was limited to a region “in the eastern part of the United States” and the Inter-American
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Highway in Central America. The Bureau’s remaining roles, such as “technical program
guidance and assistance,” lacked real authority.246
Cramer fretted that a new Department might “infringe upon the responsibilities of
Congress.” What congressman would not be alarmed by the prospect of a Secretary of
Transportation who could “approve or disprove” the construction of highways “without
reference to any of the policy declarations presently contained in . . . United States Code”
as drafted by Congress? Other members of Congress such as Congressman Frank T.
Bow of Ohio, for example, were defensive of the fact that “the Interstate System was one
part of the highway program where members of Congress were able to take part in
determining where the money would be spent. . . . I note, for example, that over $200
million has been spent on Interstate 77, which will connect Cleveland and Canton with
southeastern Ohio, West Virginia, and North Carolina, largely if not solely on the
insistence of the Members of the House directly concerned including, as I recall, our
former colleague John Henderson, members of the Virginia and West Virginia
delegations, and myself.”247
What standards would a new Department of Transportation employ in the
planning of roads? Cramer suspected the Department might resort to “averages or
statistical data or some theoretical planning concept” that could “result in a mediocre
transportation system,” versus more practical approaches developed by state
representatives. Cramer also warned that the legislation might “permit the Secretary to
divert funds from one program to another,” with only the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees to conduct reviews. The wording of the bill justified his
alarm, permitting “comparative evaluation of transportation projects . . . with a view to
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identifying those warranting support and establishing priorities.” As proposed by
Congressman Fallon, Cramer recommended limiting the role of the Secretary to making
recommendations to Congress “for consideration in the formulation and economic
evaluation of all proposals for the investment of Federal funds in transportation facilities
or equipment.”248
Cramer addressed a broad range of issues during discussion of the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1966. As usual, Cramer’s main theme remained the shaky financial
situation of the system’s trust fund, which was “$6 billion short of doing a 41,000-mile
job even by 1973.” He and some sympathetic colleagues, Congressman H.R. Gross from
Iowa and Congressman Hall from Iowa, railed against the lack of leadership in the
Johnson Administration and its attempted program of beautifying highways with trust
fund money. While construction costs were increasing from 2.5 to 2.7 percent annually,
the “slipping” of Federal matching funds to State highway departments was creating an
“embarrassing” predicament. Evolving conditions and highway standards would add
even more to the cost of the project. “[F]rom one estimate to another,” admonished
Cramer, “conditions change, forecast traffic volumes increase, and technology and design
concepts advance, all of which result in constant upgrading of standards” such as “full
widths of shoulders across long bridges, . . . more traffic lanes, additional interchanges,
and depressed sections in urban areas.” “As communities grow and urban limits expand,”
Cramer explained, “more interchanges are needed.” Between 1961 and 1965, 754
interchanges were added to the system. A new safety measure of four-laning the entire
system yielded a $265 million increase. All told, these changes would add $630 million
to the total cost.249
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The public works committee lacked the authority to provide for the $6 billion
shortage. Therefore, Cramer recommended that the Committee on Ways and Means raise
highway user taxes, transfer funds generated by “the 7 percent automobile excise taxes”
from the general fund to the highway trust fund, “[extend] the . . . termination date of the
highway trust fund,” or “[repeal] or [suspend] provisions of section 209 (g) of the
Highway Revenue Act of 1956 --- the Byrd amendment --- to permit appropriations to the
trust fund of advances from the general fund to be repaid with interest from later
revenues to the trust fund.” 250
Reimbursement for state-constructed highways along Interstate routes emerged as
a common refrain. From New York, Congressman Howard W. Robison noted that a
“rather substantial part” of the interstate completed to date had been accomplished “by
virtue of the fact that some of the more progressive States,” such as New York, Illinois,
and Florida, “constructed mileage prior to the beginning of the Interstate System which
was later incorporated into the system.” New York, for example, contributed $799.1
million worth of mileage. Robison wanted to know whether New York and other states
would be reimbursed. Cramer responded that the completion of the entire system should
precede any reimbursements, and that the issue would be dealt with in the January 1968
report to the Congress.251
Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois then asked if “there is nothing in
this bill for the acquisition of bankrupt toll roads or skyways.” Cramer replied there was
not, adding, “I hope there never is any such provision in a Federal-aid highway bill. […]
Congress is constantly under appeals to bail out those projects. […] They did bail one out
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in the State of West Virginia by making it a part of the interstate highway mileage
allowance to that State. But I personally am hoping that will never happen again.”252
Congressman Raymond F. Clevenger of Michigan also proposed reimbursement, and was
then cross-examined by Congressman Don H. Clausen, who informed Clevenger that he
should have made his proposal during previous hearings before the Federal-Aid
Subcommittee or Roads Subcommittee. Cramer then asked where Congress would
acquire the $5 billion that would be needed for “paying off existing toll roads and
bridges.”
Clevenger: I am prepared to support legislation to get the funds.
Cramer: Has the President made any such proposal? I am sure that he has
not.
Clevenger: I cannot speak for him. . . .
Cramer: This administration and the previous administrations have all
recommended against toll road reimbursement at this time. So I think that
the gentleman from Michigan is doing nothing more than wishful
thinking. . . . I think some people who are pressing the question of toll
road reimbursement ought to take equal leadership in pressing people to
do something about this $6 billion deficit with regard to the present system
of 41,000 miles that has not been completed.253
Congressman Jonathon B. Bingham rose in defense of Clevenger, declaring that
“the present program . . . works so as to penalize those States and communities which in
the past have shown initiative enough to have roads and bridges built; now they are
suffering for their energy and their investment.” Congressman Max McCarthy concurred,
once again citing New York’s loss of nearly $800 million and calling the reimbursement
issue “one of the most vexing public works problems which exists in the United States.”
McCarthy nevertheless conceded that reimbursements would have to wait until “after
1973.”254
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Though Cramer despised Johnson’s Great Society proposals, he approved of
several spending measures that would, in the long run, reduce construction costs and also
assist people disrupted by construction. He asked that the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1966 require the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a “study of advance acquisition of
rights-of-way for future construction” of the system. The purpose of this study was to
determine the most cost-effective methods for the states to obtain right-of-way, and what
the federal government could do to help finance the acquisition. Noting that the “rural
countryside adjacent to urban areas is rapidly being developed for residential
subdivisions, shopping centers, and industrial parks,” Cramer pointed out that “State
highway officials have been compelled to watch helplessly” as development proceeds
and land values rise “without being able to acquire those portions they know will be
needed for highway construction within a few years.” State highway departments needed
“legal and financial tools . . . to acquire such properties at a time when this could be done
at minimum expense to the taxpayers.” The “Cramer amendment,” he mentioned
elsewhere, which had been “on the books” for years, “provides for 7-year advance
acquisition of rights of way. The States do not use it, and we want to know why.”
Cramer hoped that the study by the Secretary of Commerce might “chart the course” for
future acquisitions.255
Cramer also desired the Secretary of Commerce, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, State highway departments, and other agencies, to perform a
thorough study of “persons and businesses . . . displaced by highway projects.” Cramer
requested long-awaited assistance for property owners along the acquisition routes, who
“sit around for 20 years, knowing their property is going to be taken, with no relief.” He
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believed these people deserved “full relocation costs, rather than the maximum of $200
for an individual or family and $3,000 for a business.” He also recommended “the
coordination of highway construction with other types of construction” and other
measures to integrate highways into the urban landscape while softening the blows on
local communities.256
Finished with his agenda for the day, Cramer stuck around for comment on other
proposals. The temperature rose a little when Congressman Cleveland proposed an
amendment that would “protect parklands, national forests and historic sites that are in
some instances being threatened by the building of interstate highways.” Objection came
from Congressman Kenneth J. Gray of Illinois, who charged that the individual states
would have ample motivation to preserve such sites. Unsure of the amendment’s
“implications,” Gray believed the committee needed time to “study” the issue.
Cleveland: [W]hat earthly objection could there be to my amendment.
You do not have to study four printed lines to know what they say. . . . It
is a statement of policy on an important issue that has bothered many
conservationists . . . It reaffirms what is probably the law. . . .
Gray: I am a little surprised that my distinguished friend, who is a strong
States righter, would once again want us to write into a Federal law what a
State must or must not do . . . Until we know what the implications are . .
. the question should be studied. . . .
Cleveland: There is no dictation here. I think you have either not read my
amendment carefully or I have not made it clear as to what the intent is. I
quote: “The Secretary shall cooperate with the States.”257
Discussion continued to heat up as several Republican Congressmen, led by
Cleveland, attempted to strike out a beautification appropriation of $493 million from the
Federal Aid Highway Act. Noting that the United States Government was borrowing to
pay its bills and facing interest rates fast approaching 6 percent, “unheard of in modern
times,” Republican Congressman Charles Raper Jonas recalled that President Johnson
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had recently urged “that the line be held and that his budget not be increased.” “I am
going to support the President . . . in his efforts to curtail spending,” sniped Jonas. “I
suggest his friends on the other side of the aisle should support him in this instance.”
Aspiring to raise the issue above partisan politics, Republican Congressman Thomas B.
Curtis pointed out that there were “many Democrats” who agreed that less essential
programs such as beautification could be shelved until later.258
Rising in defiance, Democratic Congressman Robert E. Sweeney declared the
Republicans to be inconsistent in touting the interstate system to be “imperative and in
the national interest,” while, “for purposes of perhaps political tact, in the consideration
of the particular amendment, the tune changes to, ‘Let us support the President and slow
down spending.’” “Let us set the record straight,” Sweeney bristled, “the administration’s
[original] proposal was that the highway trust fund for beautification be incorporated
without limitation. . . . I would ask the Committee to reject unanimously the suggestion,
which is a belated 11th-hour suggestion – that we scuttle the national effort to clean up
our highways.259
Cramer reiterated that his intent was not to “scuttle the program,” but that he also
did not want the trust fund to be raided for beautification purposes.
Cramer: [W]e have no testimony whatsoever . . . as to how much money it
would take . . . for general beautification purposes. . . . I challenge anyone
to show – yes, the gentleman who just rose, Mr. Sweeney – where in the
record it shows how much money is going to be needed.
Sweeney: I should like to address myself to that point, but I wish to say
one thing in correction of a statement the gentleman made . . . that the
Cleveland amendment would not do enormous destruction to the
beautification effort.
Cramer: It would not. We can do that next year.
Sweeney: I respectfully suggest, it would gut the bill.
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Cramer: I refuse to yield further. The gentleman is not answering the
question.260
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford intervened, concluding, “If you are for
economy, we should try to strike from the bill the additional authorization of $493
million.” Congressman William Howard Harsha agreed that the government “has no
money of its own with which to pay for this largesse,” and thus was “driv[ing] the cost of
borrowing money to an alltime high,” thereby hurting “the small businessmen, and the
homebuilders” who were “trying to find adequate funds with which to meet their current
needs.” Despite Republican efforts, the amendment to strike out the beautification
appropriation failed, 48 to 65. Cramer left the meeting shortly thereafter, forfeiting an
opportunity to comment on an amendment that would permit governors to divert highway
funds into mass transportation systems, an amendment that was nevertheless handily
defeated.261
On August 31, 1966, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1966.
Fuzzy sentiments set the tone for the final hearing. Democratic Congressman Kluczynski
described Cramer as “one of the great men on the minority side, . . . a very good friend of
mine, who . . . knows as much about highways as anyone in the country.” Cramer
responded in kind: “There is no finer and more cooperative man in the Congress than the
gentleman from Illinois.” One cause for Cramer’s warmth was clear. Ford had presented
a “motion to recommit the bill” that struck out the $493 million beautification
appropriation, a motion that had prevailed.262
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The Missing Link

In 1965, Dick Pope, creator of Cypress Gardens, urged citizens of Bradenton to
“holler” for an Interstate 75 extension from St. Petersburg.263 Conspicuously missing
from the Florida interstate outlays was a connection from Tampa Bay to Miami.
Construction costs continued to inflate year after year, creating a sense of urgency among
road officials, politicians, and constituents. As costs increased, a succession of legislators,
governors, and road officials from all around the state engaged in a heated debate on the
question of how to build the “Missing Link.”
Without question, highway officials agreed that a controlled-access route should
be built from Tampa to Miami, but most assumed that the Florida Turnpike Authority
would construct the route. On its face, the question was simple. Two options remained:
Florida could try to secure Interstate status so that the federal government would pay for
ninety percent of the highway. Or Florida could build the highway as part of the
turnpike. At first, it may have seemed the question was already settled. The federal
government had already allotted Florida 1,100 miles of highway; Florida had already
decided where to place that mileage; the Missing Link didn’t make the cut. That might
have been the end of the debate, were it not for the remarks of a United States
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Congressman whose prescient knowledge of interstate highway matters was impossible
to ignore.
Since 1957, if not earlier, and through the rest of his Congressional career, the
goal of bringing an expressway through St. Petersburg and connecting Tampa Bay to
Miami was at the top of Cramer’s agenda. Newspaper reports provide glimpses into his
efforts. In a speech to the St. Petersburg shoe merchants, Cramer foresaw problems with
the termination of I-4, which, the St. Petersburg Times summarized, would “put too great
responsibility on state, county and city governments to provide connecting links to handle
traffic.” St. Petersburg needed as much expressway as possible to “channel traffic on to
the Sunshine Skyway without clogging existing east-west and north-south arteries.” As
of 1957, 1,000 miles of interstate mileage still had not been designated, so Cramer put in
a request for the Tampa Bay to Miami link, which had to compete with requests from
other states “amounting to some 12,000 miles.” In lieu of the states’ mileage demands,
the Senate Public Works Committee considered a bill adding 7,000 miles to the system,
but failed.264
On February 2, 1962, the mileage issue made Tampa Tribune headlines when W.
T. (Billy) Mayo, the State Road Department’s Interstate Highway Administrator, claimed
that Florida “stood little chance” of obtaining extra mileage for southwest Florida. His
assumption was based upon a recent application for “a relatively few more miles” for a
causeway at Cape Canaveral, an obvious shoe-in, Mayo figured, given the site’s
relevance to national defense. “If they wouldn’t give us any for that,” concluded Mayo,
“I feel certain we couldn’t get any” for southwest Florida. While Governor Farris Bryant
offered no comment, press aide John Evans was pessimistic, noting the “reluctance” of
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the Bureau of Public Roads to offer extra miles. Former Governor Collins nevertheless
believed that the state should make “a last-ditch effort . . . before a final decision is made
on building a toll turnpike in that area.” That same week, the state authorized a $60,000
feasibility study for a Tampa to Miami turnpike.265
The following day, Cramer’s cherubic face appeared in the Tribune with a look as
bold as the accompanying headline, “Cramer Sees Tampa-Miami Route Being
Designated ‘Before 1968.’” Cramer predicted that “‘there isn’t any question that toward
the end of the program (in 1967-68) or before,’ the federal government will re-evaluate
its interstate program [and] consider additional mileage allocations.” Until then, Cramer
recommended that the state initiate a free road program “on a 50-50 basis” with the
federal government, but the state did not take action.266
It is unclear what assurances Cramer had in 1962 that the Interstate program
would be reevaluated by 1968. As ranking Republican on the public works committee,
he knew a lot of things no one back in Florida knew. What is certain is that he did
everything in his power to make sure that the reevaluation took place according to his
designs. As it turned out, his 1968 prediction was prophetic.
The task of bringing mileage to southwest Florida was no straightforward matter.
It demanded the full use of Cramer’s authority and ability. It is not hard to detect in
Cramer’s maneuvers some subtle and devastatingly effective measures to discreetly make
way for the construction of expressways through his own district and region, yet without
leaving the faucet on for too many other members of Congress to tap the same resources
for their own districts. In his endeavors to preserve the authority of the Bureau of Public
Roads, block appropriations for beautification, and deny until a later date reimbursements
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to existing highways along the interstate route, Cramer endeavored to ensure the timely
completion of the Interstate system and prevent it from being manipulated by overlynarrow, local interests, the worst-case scenario being the proverbial politician trying to
route the highway through his backyard, charge a toll, and collect federal funds at the
same time, with federal mileage elsewhere denied where it was actually needed.
In 1965, Cramer inserted a crucial piece of legislation into that year’s Federal-Aid
Highway Act that in following years would work in favor of southwest Florida. The
measure called for the Bureau of Public Roads to issue a report, in January 1968 and
“every second year thereafter,” containing “estimates of the future highway needs of the
Nation,” thus providing for “an orderly development of the Federal-aid highway
programs after 1972.”267 (Responsibility for the report would eventually transfer to the
Department of Transportation.)
Once signed into law, Cramer put a great deal of effort into steering the report,
exploiting to the fullest his position in the public works committee. Much effort went
into ensuring that the new Department of Transportation cooperated with the states,
rather than devolve into a maverick technocracy, as previously discussed. On April 28,
1966, Cramer voiced his concern: “There have been disturbing rumors during the past
few months that the States might not be permitted to fully participate in the formulation
of plans for a program for improving the Nation’s highway systems after 1972.” It would
probably have been fairly easy for one or more State Road Departments to slip through
the cracks of the proposed study. Cramer was not about to allow Florida to be one of
those states. Although the study was signed into law on August 28, 1965, Cramer learned
on February 25, 1966 that Floyd B. Boyen, chairman of the Florida Road Department,
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had still not received a federal request to “formulate any recommended future
improvement program” for Florida.268
On March 15, 1966, Cramer wrote to Federal Highway Administrator Rex
Whitton, saying, “I am quite disturbed to find that apparently the Bureau of Public Roads
has not requested the State road department to formulate a recommended improvement
program.” On April 19, Whitton testified before the House Public Works Subcommittee
on Roads. “During interrogation by me,” Cramer recalled, “Mr. Whitton stated that the
Bureau of Public Roads was in the process of formulating guidelines to be followed by
the States in submitting their recommendations,” and that “the guidelines would be
submitted to the States early enough to permit them to make proper studies.” Somewhat
reassured, but not easily cajoled, Cramer reminded Congress of the crucial role of the
states in shaping federal highway programs: “Improvement of Federal-aid highways,
ever since the commencement of the Federal-aid highway program in 1916, has been
carried out cooperatively by the Federal Government and the States. This partner
relationship has worked exceptionally well and has been the model emulated by other
programs. The present highway program, including construction of the Interstate and
Defense Highway System, enacted into law in 1956, was a result of joint studies,
planning, and recommendations of the Bureau of Public Roads and the State highway
departments. It is essential to the public interest that future highway programs continue
this partnership concept.”269
In a corresponding letter to Cramer, Whitton provided an update on the state of
the Bureau’s review. It is worth noting that Whitton’s description of the review process
closely matched Cramer’s worst fears of how a new Department of Transportation might
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conduct studies, such as resorting to “averages or statistical data or some theoretical
planning concept” that could “result in a mediocre transportation system.” The situation
was precarious enough under the current system. Understandably, Whitton requested that
the states “classify” all their roads based on the “functions they perform . . . on a
consistent basis throughout the country.” But before the states could do that, they had to
wait for federal officials to develop assessment standards. Using congressional
guidelines, the federal government would then designate where new roads would be built.
Hence, Congress still had a part in planning new routes, but it was becoming more
indirect. Assisting the evaluation, said Whitton, the government would “have the
advantage of an analytical tool […] that will permit a mathematical simulation of travel
based on estimates of future population and economic growth and distribution.”270 Such
an analytical tool probably did not inspire confidence in members of Congress such as
Cramer, confident that the individual states had a pretty good idea where new highways
were needed. Cramer would have to find creative ways to work the system to his
advantage.
In 1966, Cramer pointed up the need for a “Tampa-St. Petersburg-Miami”
expressway during the Federal Highway Act of 1966 hearings. In the process, he
skillfully insisted that existing state toll roads along interstate routes should not be
reimbursed. The measure was effective at reserving funds for un-built routes such as
those he desired, considering that toll roads undoubtedly comprised the bulk of state
constructed expressways. The measure was also, at least on the surface, ethically benign,
that is, not overtly self-serving, no matter to what degree he was actually shaping federal
policy to serve his own district.271
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With the January 1968 deadline approaching, 1967 was a crucial year for any
state hoping to gain extra mileage. On January 16, 1967, Cramer reminded Congress that
the Department of Transportation’s report was to “include specific route designations for
any proposed increases in mileage on the Interstate System.” With that in mind, he
introduced three bills. The first called for “the construction of an interstate highway
from the Interstate 75 terminus at Tampa, Fla., and from the Interstate 4 terminus at St.
Petersburg, Fla., through Bradenton, Sarasota, Venice, Punta Gorda, Fort Lauderdale, and
Homestead.” “In my opinion,” he reasoned, this “missing link is one of the most
obvious inadequacies in the Interstate System. . . . There is no interstate route whatsoever
linking the west coast of Florida with the lower east coast area, despite the fact that the
west coast would be the shortest route from many Midwestern and Eastern cities to the
Fort Lauderdale-Miami area. In addition, the west coast of Florida is one of the fastest
growing areas in the entire nation. Interstate 75, which links such populated areas as
Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, St. Louis, New Orleans, Dallas, and Chicago, with
the west coast of Florida presently deadends in Tampa. Interstate 4, which links many
populous areas of the eastern United States to the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater area,
presently deadends in St. Petersburg. I therefore feel it essential that a new interstate
highway be constructed so that the interstate traffic presently terminating in the TampaSt. Petersburg area can be funneled down the lower west coast to the Fort LauderdaleMiami area.”272
Cramer’s second bill, which never made it off the ground, “provided for the
construction of Interstate 65 from Montgomery, Alabama to Ocala, via Tallahassee.273 A
third bill was intended to prevent toll interests from building on designated interstate
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routes, a measure that would prove of crucial importance in Florida. Any tolls installed
on the interstate would have to be in the interests of the public and would also require
permission from the Secretary of Transportation.274
On November 9, 1967, he introduced a crucial measure, requiring the Secretary of
Transportation to “give due regard to the extension of routes which now terminate within
municipalities that are served by a single Interstate route so as to provide traffic service
entirely through such municipalities to connect with an arterial highway beyond the
boundaries thereof. This . . . provision is to remedy the situation now existing in some
municipalities where the Interstate System terminates within a municipality and will
dump large volumes of traffic on a city street system that is inadequate to accommodate
movement of such traffic in and through the municipality.”275 This condition made St.
Petersburg and Tampa prime candidates for additional mileage, given the termination of
Interstate 75 in Tampa and Interstate 4 in St. Petersburg. Cramer thus put Southwest
Florida on the front burner without even mentioning the region by name. On January 2,
1968, this measure was signed into law in the Howard-Cramer Act, which also added 200
miles to the Interstate system to be shared between Florida and New Jersey.276
Although the Howard-Cramer Act favored cities like St. Petersburg and Tampa
where federal expressways dead-ended, it did not specify that the additional mileage
would go specifically to these cities. According to Congressman John L. Mica, Cramer
“crafted” the 1968 Federal Aid Highway Act to southwest Florida’s advantage. Not only
did Congress demand that the Secretary of Transportation privilege the Tampa Bay area
in allotting the extra 200 miles, Congress also added another 1,500 miles to the interstate
system, for which Congress insisted the Tampa to Miami route should receive prime
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consideration. Mica described Cramer’s management of the 1968 Federal Highway Act
as “the capstone of his service on the Public Works Committee.”277
Once again, Cramer earned the warm esteem of his colleagues, including Clausen:
“I believe, in all sincerity, that the gentleman from Florida is respected by members of
the subcommittee as much or possibly more than any other Member on either side of the
aisle. Certainly, no one has been a better student, become more knowledgeable, or
demonstrated the ability to articulate our road and highway message to the Congress or
the Nation, than the ranking Republican on the Public Works Committee --- Bill Cramer.
I am sure that future generations of Americans will come to appreciate the work he has
done and the contributions he has made to our nation’s road and highway system.”
In addition, Speaker of the House John McCormack “came down from his rostrum to
personally congratulate Cramer and . . . was quoted as saying: ‘Bill, this has been one of
the most statesmanlike presentations that I have observed since coming to the
Congress.’”278
Back in Florida, Cramer pressed the issue with Boyd.279 However, when Cramer
boasted of increasing the state’s mileage, critics responded with doubts and concerns that
the congressman might actually be placing Florida’s road programs in jeopardy in the
name of politics. Cramer assumed that the signing of the 1968 Federal Aid Highway Act
would “slide into reality” the construction of the missing link, especially given the fact
that Boyd was a Floridian. However, the Tampa Tribune reported that “unnamed ‘high
officials’” had warned “state officials that assignment of the additional mileage will be on
a substitute basis; therefore, the 1,500 additional miles created by Congress was only
“theoretical;” “to get a Tampa-Miami Interstate 75 Florida will have to give up an equal
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dollar volume on other interstate roads,” such as I-10 and I-95. The American
Association of State Highway Officials shared this interpretation of the 1968 Act. 280
Given the Interstate system’s tight budget, such fears were not irrational. The
Tribune reported that funding would decrease from $4 billion every year “through 1973”
to only $2.25 billion for 1974. Without an increased appropriation for 1974, warned state
officials, “someone will have to decide where the available money can best be spent.”
Hank Drane, political editor for the Jacksonville Times Union, was also worried: “It
would be unfortunate ... for I-95 or I-10 to become the missing link.” The Tribune also
voiced concern that designation of I-75 from Tampa to Miami could be just as harmful to
southwest Florida’s highway development, given the delays, budget limits, and complex
protocol of the interstate program. The Turnpike Authority, it was argued, could get the
job done much faster, because, unlike the Interstate program, it was not required to
purchase all the right-of-way and relocate individuals in the path of the highway in
advance of construction. While the state could construct the road “in about five years,” it
was estimated, the federal government would not complete the job until 1985.281 Later
that year, Cramer denied the charge that the federal government would take a lot longer
to construct the highway, claiming that right-of-way could be quickly bought and
contracts begun in 1970, with the help of $300 million in federal funds.282
As a new toll versus free debate emerged, the ‘will of the people’ became a
contested topic. “To most of the communities south of Tampa Bay,” claimed the
Tribune, “the debate over tolls or no-tolls is academic. Community leaders say they want
the road built—built by whatever means possible, and finished not later than
yesterday.”283 According to a St. Petersburg Times report, however, that was not
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completely true. While Richard A. A. Martin, chairman of the Highway Committee for
the Sarasota Chamber of Commerce, assisted the Turnpike Authority with its feasibility
studies, he openly hoped for delays in the Turnpike’s progress. “The longer the study
time,” Martin reasoned, “the more time Mr. Cramer . . . has to get us an interstate.”284
In the weeks following the 1968 general election, prospects for a federally
funded I-75 in southwest Florida finally came to fruition. On November 24, 1968, the
Times reported that Federal Highway Administrator Lowell K. Bridwell would announce
the fate of Florida’s missing link, which was competing with 20 other routes totaling
10,000 miles, for a share of the added 1,500 miles. Practically quoting Cramer, Bridwell
hinted that the Tampa Bay-Miami route was one of the “obvious and serious gaps” in the
Interstate system. Even if Cramer did not have his way during the remaining months of
the Johnson Administration, he was predicted to have “a pipeline into the White House,”
given his “early and ardent” support of the Nixon campaign. Nixon, it might be added,
was “a frequent visitor to Miami and has a substantial investment in real estate there.”
“I’m fully confident we’ll get the mileage,” said Cramer, “either under the present
administration or under the new one.”285 Days before Boyd was expected to announce
the recipients of the additional mileage, Cramer viewed the event as a test of
congressional authority. “I understand the recommendations are on Boyd’s desk,” he
said on December 10. “If the congressional mandate is followed, I-75 has to be
included.”286
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Mickey Mouse Road

On December 13, 1968, Boyd approved a “252-mile extension” for southwest
Florida’s missing link, although Florida was denied a 52 mile extension of I-95 through
Homestead to connect it with I-75. Florida fared nearly twice as well as any other state,
with 138.5 miles allotted to Texas, 130 miles to New York, 109 miles to California, 105.8
to Wisconsin, 38.8 to Georgia, and 19.2 to Alabama. The Times celebrated Cramer’s
“legislative coup,” noting how he “tailored a piece of legislation to fit Florida’s need for a
Tampa-Bay-Miami interstate link.”287 “This is one of the happiest days we’ve had in this
office,” proclaimed Cramer’s administrative assistant, Richard Haber, who reportedly
“beamed with pride.” 288 The Tribune also acknowledged Cramer’s allies, including
Representatives Sam Gibbons of Tampa, James Haley of Sarasota, and William Rogers
of Palm Beach, all Democrats.289
An editorial in the Tribune proclaimed, “All Florida will profit from this
expansion of the high-speed highway network but Tampa and the West Coast will be
especial beneficiaries. Present routes southward from Tampa to the thriving cities of
Bradenton, Sarasota, Fort Myers and Naples are congested and often hazardous. Poor
roads retard the development of all. Tampa, sitting at the crossroads of two Interstate
highways, I-75 and I-4, will have an advantage few cities enjoy. This fast and cheap
accessibility to other parts of Florida and the nation will be an economic asset of
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tremendous value.”290
The Tribune editorial also touted Boyd’s designation as “an encouraging example
of bi-partisan effort,” the kind that “Floridians expect:” “For the motorist caught on one
of the crowded two-lane roads leading to Miami is neither Democrat nor Republican;
he’s just a disgusted driver.”291
Following the immediate rush of excitement, Floridians began scrutinizing
Boyd’s approved route, finding many aspects of it unusual and unsavory. The criticisms
were numerous and widespread; and the reaction was immediate and fierce. Of particular
concern was the omission of a proposed beltway along the eastern side of Tampa Bay.
The beltway was designed to avoid the Tampa business district, through which it was
deemed “impractical and too expensive” to build, according to Jay W. Brown of the
Florida Road Department. Rather, a longer, circuitous I-75 beltway would begin north of
Tampa, extending eastward around the city before progressing to Miami.292 Upon
discovering the omission of this eastern loop, the Times described how southbound traffic
on I-75 would face two unsavory alternatives: continue driving on U.S. 41 to Palmetto, or
“face the Skyway toll” on the western beltway through St. Petersburg. (The Interstate
route just past the southern end of the Skyway also included three to five miles of nonlimited access highway, a definite hazard. State Road Board Member Donald R. Crane,
Jr. noted, “That’s being four-laned now, . . . but maybe we better buy limited access
property there.”)293
The Times speculated that Boyd’s omission must have been a political oversight.
A report, entitled “Interstate 75: ‘Missing Link’ in Political Thought?” noted that Boyd’s
decision made the western route through Pinellas County the principal path to Miami.
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Quoted in the report was an anonymous, “politically astute [Republican] Floridian on
Capitol Hill,” who puzzled over why Boyd, a Democrat, would reward a Republican
Congressman’s district when he could have just as easily reward Democrat Sam Gibbons
of Tampa, who desired the expressway on the eastern side of Tampa Bay. “Well,”
responded Boyd, “it wasn’t a politically motivated decision. […] Most of that mileage
went to states with Republican governors and a lot of Republican congressmen and
senators. We didn’t do it on a political basis. We did it on a basis of need as we saw it,
based on the criteria which were in the act. Politics didn’t enter into it.”294
A second set of dilemmas surrounding the southern part of the I-75 extension
erupted in consternation throughout southern Florida. First, at its terminus, I-75 would
link to “the overloaded Palmetto Expressway in northwest Dade,” described as “a death
row for motorists” and “among the major traffic engineering disasters of a county with
the first or second largest automotive vehicle registration per capita in the nation.”295
Said an editorial in the Miami Herald: “It would be difficult to find a professional
highway engineer in South Florida who would recommend dumping more traffic into the
Palmetto Bypass as the Boyd plan would do with the southeast terminus of I-75. We
suggest that the Secretary of Transportation find out how many people have been killed
on the bypass before he ties it into the Interstate system.”296
The Palmetto Expressway predicament was symptomatic of a much larger
problem. The State Road Department had asked for I-75 to run alongside the Tamiami
Trail. Boyd’s Department ignored that request and switched the route to Alligator Alley.
Initially, Boyd’s announcement appeared, to some, to have marked the end of Florida’s
Tampa-to-Miami toll route endeavors. “Now such a toll road cannot be built without
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specific permission of the U.S. Department of Transportation,” reported the Tribune after
Boyd’s announcement, citing a “sleeper clause” in the 1968 Federal Highway Act barring
the construction of “any toll road in the same traffic corridor as an interstate” without
federal approval.297 However, the Times and a vitriolic editorial from the Miami Herald
offered a different interpretation. “The plan,” warned the Times, is to four-lane ‘Alligator
Alley,’ a toll road from Naples to Fort Lauderdale, and make it part of the interstate
extension --- possibly with the toll still intact.” 298
In addition, Boyd’s rejection of the US 41 route desired by Cramer, an “outraged”
State Road Board Chairman Michael O’Neill, and many others, dealt southern Florida an
I-75 that would stray far north of “the huge jetport under construction west of Miami.”299
Exclaimed the Herald: “One of the reasons for locating the new South Florida jetport
just north of the Tamiami trail was the expectation that I-75 was coming through to serve
as a high-speed, limited access highway for both private cars and public transportation
serving air travelers. […] [W]e would not be surprised if it turns out that the [Turnpike]
authority is right now thinking about building a toll road between the jetport and Miami.
That would be a money grabber to rival Miami’s airport expressway that took in
$188,530 last month in dimes.”300
Extending criticisms beyond Boyd’s decision, newspapers from around the state
launched attacks against Boyd himself, along with the Turnpike Authority and its
beneficiaries. Florida’s prominent new Disney establishment meanwhile armed critics
with a novel form of epithet. While the St. Petersburg Times likened the Turnpike
Authority to “the Beagle Boys watching Scrooge McDuck’s money, the Miami Herald
complained of the “Mickey Mousing of I-75, all at the expense of the taxpaying
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motorist:301 “This hapless chap pays once in state and federal gasoline taxes, next in
surcharges to fund the Interstate program, and thirdly, though perhaps not finally (they
get you coming and going) in toll charges.”302
AAA Motor Clubs of Florida complained that the I-75 extension “critically
ignores the worst needs of population centers while protecting the ever-eager bond
schemers with two built-in toll traps. . . . The Boyd plan, is brazen, bizarre and is an
affront to every citizen and community on the west coast of Florida. . . . Mr. Boyd’s
proposal ignores the will of Congress and the desire of the people of Florida during the
dying days of the Johnson administration.”303
In addition to the above criticisms, “enough to hurt a few eardrums in
Washington,” the St. Petersburg Times circulated a more serious allegation.304 Citing a
source close to Boyd, the Times claimed that Boyd had actually intended “to veto any
mileage for Florida.” When apprised of Boyd’s demand, Federal Highway Administrator
Lowell K. Bridwell and Director of Public Roads Frank Turner purportedly “protested to
Boyd” on the grounds that Congress insisted on providing for Florida’s missing link. In
reply, Boyd told the officials to “approve only the minimum necessary.” Unsure of
Boyd’s “motive,” the Times pointed out that the Interstate expansion “engineered by
Republican Cramer was opposed by the Democratic Administration.”305 Boyd described
the whole scenario as “ridiculous,” insisting “that he had no feelings whatsoever about
the Florida project.”306
Reacting to Boyd’s omission of the eastern loop, the Hillsborough County
Commission quickly turned to the Turnpike Authority to construct the eastern bypass as
part of a comprehensive road development plan including six other expressways.
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However, most, including State Road Department officials who withheld their appeals to
the Department of Transportation, agreed that the prudent course of action was to wait
until the accession of former Massachusetts governor John Volpe, “an old friend of
Cramer,” the new Transportation Secretary under President Nixon. Then, Cramer would
have a good opportunity to appeal for the eastern loop and reroute I-75 along the
Tamiami Trail. “I cannot understand nor do I approve of the DOT’s deletion of the
Tampa bypass connecting Interstate 75,” said Cramer. “I have already put into motion
the necessary expressions of interest in revising this decision. . . . With a total of
approximately 58 miles presently still unallocated, I believe it may be possible to get the
needed mileage (approximately 32 miles) added to include the Tampa bypass.
The Times added, “If it isn’t possible to get it approved . . . [Cramer] will get it
incorporated in the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act.”307 The state of Florida had perhaps
another ‘ace in the hole,’ having elected Nixon in 1960 and 1968, “the 210,000 vote
margin the state gave him [in 1968] comprised about half his national popular vote lead
over Hubert Humphrey.”308
On the opposing side, Turnpike Chairman Charles W. Rex also planned to appeal
to Volpe to “scuttle the interstate for a toll road.” Volpe, said Rex, “is governor of
Massachusetts and they’re very toll road conscious.” The Times emphasized Rex’s
sardonic sense of humor. Looking forward to a December 17 Hillsborough County
meeting, Rex planned to ask the pro-Interstate, State Road Board Chairman Michael
O’Neill to explain Boyd’s decision and “watch his face turn red.”309
The most glaring problem with Boyd’s designation of I-75 along Alligator Alley
was that, thanks to Cramer’s legislative endeavors, its routing along a toll route was
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unlawful. According to Cliff Enfield, who now served as minority counsel for the House
Committee on Public Works, the Department of Transportation had three options:
“Change the law, get the toll removed (this would be up to the state) or move the
route.”310 Boyd believed the routing was legal, though his reasoning is unclear.
According to the Times, Boyd believed that Florida might “be required to pay off the toll
road bonds before it could obtain the interstate construction money,” an action that would
likely benefit toll-way bondholders, assuming the Turnpike interests could be compelled
to relinquish the route.311 Earlier in the debacle, a Tribune editorialist posited the notion
that Boyd’s “cheerful blueprint” for Alligator Alley could be put into action: “It can be
aided in . . . studies already done by the Turnpike Authority. Governor Kirk, we trust,
will instruct his Turnpike board to turn over to his [largely pro-Interstate] Road Board
whatever data will be helpful.”312
Amidst the fray, the 1969 event pointed up the need for a reorganization of
Florida’s transportation governance. John Pennekamp of the Miami Herald emphasized
problems stemming from the conflicting agendas and “lack of coordination” between the
Turnpike and the Road Board. “[I]n spite of the fact that Dade County is by far the
biggest gasoline tax contributor to the Road Department, and most of the tollway traffic
is generated here,” the region’s contributions were not reflected in the local road quality,
with “residents riding jam-packed on two-laned highways, some the busiest in the
South.” Pennekamp concluded: “Certainly one coordinated department would serve
better than viewpoints as widely separated as . . . the two chairmen.”313 Months later, in
July, 1969, Florida created a Department of Transportation, with some measure of
authority over the Turnpike Authority, and abolished the Road Board.
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Despite Florida’s optimistic outlook with Nixon in office, nearly a year passed
with the state still in uncertainty over the fate of its expressways. The only good news for
the Interstate was that the Turnpike Authority could not legally build along the Interstate
route without Volpe’s approval. Cramer said he would be “amazed and shocked” if
Volpe approved. Cramer also persuaded Volpe to “set aside” Boyd’s Alligator Alley
designation while the Florida Road Department submitted new recommendations to the
Federal Highway Administration. “Then,” said Cramer, “it is just a matter of getting
approval of the secretary and the federal highway administration,” a process that would
take three or four months. Cramer was also “hopeful” about the eastern loop, especially
since it looked as though the District of Columbia might forfeit some mileage.314
Governor Kirk was apparently of two minds, “talk[ing] off and on of building a toll road”
along the bypass, but “back[ing] off after Cramer . . . insisted the bypass would be
restored.” Kirk also ordered a “moratorium . . . on new interstate highway construction
contracts,” described by his administration as a measure to “fight inflation.”315
With regards to highway legislation, including the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1969, nothing of great import stands out in Cramer’s remarks in the 91st Congress.
Numerous other members of the Public Works Committee shared his desire for ample
appropriations to provide for the additional Interstate mileage, so he merely backed such
proposals with his support.316 Likewise, with a Republican Secretary of Transportation,
there was no need at the moment, and perhaps it would have been pretentious at the time,
to direct the actions of the Department of Transportation. On October 7, 1969, the Times
reported that Volpe and Cramer would jointly announce federal authorization for a $60
million, 47-mile Tampa bypass. For the time being, the Turnpike Authority would be
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barred from building along the route, which would eventually be constructed, toll-free.317
Contrary to the jetport interests, Interstate 75 from Tampa to Miami would be constructed
along the Alligator Alley route, but without tolls.
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Southern Strategy

As an accomplished public works legislator, Cramer was hopeful that Florida
would welcome his bid for the United States Senate. He was in line to accept the
Republican nomination for the ailing George Smathers’s seat in 1968, which would
indeed have been an opportune time for Cramer to campaign. Along with his public
works endeavors, Cramer’s recent accomplishments on the Judiciary Committee had won
widespread approval from conservatives, who were quite happy with the recent passage
of his anti-riot legislation in 1967. Instead, he yielded the opportunity to Edward J.
Gurney.318 As early as March 1965, Gurney had been considered as a candidate for
governor for the 1966 election, receiving “strong sentiment” throughout Florida,
according to GOP National Committeewoman Helene Morris.319 While Claude Kirk
became the Republican nominee, Gurney entertained thoughts of running in the 1968
Senate race as early as December 1965.320 It was not long after Gurney won the 1968
Senate race that Republicans looked forward to taking the remaining Senate seat in 1970.
Cramer was “seriously considering” running for Senate, and Gurney was supportive. In
January 1969, Gurney predicted that Florida Republicans, led by the state GOP Chairman
William Murfin, Kirk, Gurney, and three Congressmen including Cramer, were “going to
go into the 1970 election in Florida completely united and unified.”321
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“Frankly,” remarked Cramer, “I was a little surprised at the amount of
enthusiasm, which seemed universal, that I encountered at . . . Ed’s victory reception. . . .
[B]ut I don’t have to have the job on the other hand. I have a good berth in the House
and I am certainly not going to give it up unless I am pretty certain I can win.”322
At an April 9 meeting, Cramer aide Jack Insco remarked that it was “amazing
how the Gurney people are coming across to us.” Asked whether he would rather run
against Farris Bryant, Sam Gibbons of Tampa, or Paul Rogers of West Palm Beach,
Cramer replied, “if you wish to talk philosophically, then I would hope to be in a position
– as the senator (Gurney) was – to run against a liberal.”
Gurney offered supportive remarks. Cramer “looks like a pretty live prospect,”
said Gurney. “All the people who worked for me, I am sure, will pretty much support
Congressman Cramer.” Louis Frey, freshman Congressman from Orlando, was
considering the seat, but was waiting to see what Cramer would do.323 Later that year,
Ray Osborne campaigned for the seat.324 With or without Gurney’s support, Cramer was
by far the strongest Republican contender. Asked whether he would support Cramer in a
primary, Gurney assumed Cramer would run unopposed and there would be no
primary.325
In May 1969, rumors spread that the Republicans might “Dump Cramer.” Gurney
replied, “I’m a party leader, . . . and I will have no part in dumping anyone. I don’t know
where these rumors are coming from.” 326 A letter from Gurney to Cramer indicates that
as late as March 24, 1970, the two politicians shared warm relations.327 Then, on April
20, Gurney unceremoniously dumped Cramer in a press release that neglected to even
mention the Congressman’s name. 328 By the following month, Gurney was promoting a
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“nation-wide drive to raise 1-million dollars” for a new Republican contestant, Harrold
Carswell, a move that disturbed many Republicans. “What is good for […] a faction of
the Republican Party in Florida,” responded Dorothy Swanson of Winter Park, “is not
necessarily good for the Republican Party nation-wide. . . . [T]his investment . . . couldn’t
be a more effective scheme to promote internal friction than if the Democrats had thought
it up. . . . [D]uring my primary campaign for State Committeewoman in 1966 . . . Rep.
Gurney told me he never had and never would, take part in primary campaigns and
added, ‘You know me better than that.’ I believed him. But now it appears that the
sterling qualities of statesmanship were only a plating over the cheap brass of power
politics. It is disillusioning.”329
Carswell was a quintessential post-office Republican of the South, defined by
legal scholar Bruce H. Kalk as office seekers “[d]edicated to seeking postmasterships and
federal marshallships whenever the GOP was in power” who bore little chance of being
“selected on merit alone.” Kalk offers a devastating account of Carswell. During the
Eisenhower administration, Carswell was appointed federal attorney and, with Cramer’s
recommendation, federal judge for the Northern District of Florida.330 Carswell,
“reluctant to exert himself,” managed to have the lowest caseload in the Fifth Circuit, yet
his backlog grew to the extent that Congress had to create another judgeship for his
district.331 Nevertheless, in 1969, President Nixon appointed Carswell to the U.S. Court
of Appeals.332 An “ill-closeted segregationist,” Carswell seemed a good fit for Nixon’s
southern strategy and was nominated for the Supreme Court in January, 1970. However,
even the President was shocked when he discovered that earlier in his career, Carswell
had sold property with a whites only covenant and chartered a whites-only booster club
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for the Florida State University football team.333 Carswell’s nomination was scuttled, but
his career in politics was not quite over. Regardless of his previous endorsements of
Cramer, Gurney suddenly endorsed Carswell in the 1970 Florida senate primary:
Sometimes dramatic events can verge to an inevitable happening and such
is true of Judge Carswell’s candidacy to the U.S. Senate. President Nixon
pledged to the people to change the balance and direction of the Supreme
Court. Twice his will has been slaughtered by the Senate, pressured by
the very liberal forces of this country. The Carswell and Haynsworth
nominations were much more than Supreme Court nominations, they were
massive confrontation struggles between the very liberal activists against
the majority of the nation – the silent majority, if you will. The time has
come to take this contest to the people in the elections of 1970. Judge
Carswell has offered himself to go to the Senate and help the President
fight this battle for progressive conservative government. Judge Carswell
is committed to a cause; it’s right, it’s just, it must be fought for, and it
will be won. I congratulate Judge Carswell, I offer him my support and I
urge all people of Florida, Republicans and Democrats, to join this cause
for progressive conservative government and send Harrold Carswell to the
United States Senate.334
The St. Petersburg Times played its part in the race. Despite sharing with Cramer
an almost identical highway construction agenda, Democrat Nelson Poynter did not
support Cramer, and his paper played up the contest between Cramer and Carswell. A
lengthy Times profile described Cramer as “Little Boy Conservative with his thumb in
the hole in the dike, trying to prevent the erosion of change.” At first, the profile put
forth the appearance of dealing evenhandedly with Cramer: “Friends will find mirrored
in the record the image of a man who is flexible, conservative, staunchly Republican, and
jealous of the rights of the states. Foes will see instead a man who is illogical, negative,
abrasively partisan, and racist.”335
At last, the Times landed on a central point: “This much is clear: Cramer’s
greatest consistency is his inconsistency. He will oppose a new departure today, but if
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time brings popularity to the program, he will not just support it but embrace it. […] He
will fight a proposal if it comes from a Democrat in the White House, but back the same
idea without a blush if a Republican asks his support.”336
From there, it got personal: “His public ethics are those of a private businessman.
Cramer makes no effort at hounds-tooth cleanliness, nor to avoid the appearance of evil.
Since coming to Congress in 1955, he has stated unequivocally that his income from his
St. Petersburg law firm is nobody’s business, headed a laundry that did business with the
government, managed to avoid prosecution on a minor hit-and-run charge that followed a
cocktail party, and driven a luxury car provided under a very favorable leasing
arrangement by the Ford Motor Company.”337
While the article provided details on the more controversial aspects of his career,
the Times only had a few points to make about Cramer’s accomplishments on the Roads
Subcommittee: that back in 1959, he voted against a highway safety measure before
becoming a highway safety advocate; and that since 1956, Cramer had “supported
highway construction legislation,” to say nothing of the many proposals he initiated and
the remarkable interstate mileage he helped appropriate for Florida and the rest of the
nation.338
Cramer won 62.5 percent of the primary vote, but lost the general election to
Democrat Lawton Chiles by a 7.7 percent margin.339
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Breaking New Ground

Gurney’s endorsement of Carswell coincided with the April 21 commencement of
the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act hearings. Cramer later said, towards the end of his
last year in Congress, that he had been “determined,” with the bipartisan cooperation of
his colleagues in the Public Works Committee, “to break new ground.” “Incidentally,”
the retiring Congressman said, “I had to break with my administration, the present
administration, in order to do so.”340
It is interesting to observe the evolution of Cramer’s highway agenda through the
course of his career. During his early years, an unsympathetic critic might presume that
to Cramer, the Interstate System was an end in itself, that the Congressman was merely a
talented monomaniac who would continue legislating barebones expressways ad
infinitum. According to the Times, it took him a while to come around on highway
safety, and he made every effort to shelve beautification efforts. But throughout the
course of his career, and especially from 1968 onward, the legislator can be seen
acknowledging and, with his characteristic sharpness, strategy, and prioritization,
thoughtfully addressing an increasingly complex array of challenges. It is not as though
Cramer suddenly became aware of these challenges and then abruptly reacted. Rather, he
had been schooling himself on various transportation issues for years. He was simply
unwavering in his priorities. Until Eisenhower’s first priority was accomplished, to
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expend energy on other projects would have been profligacy. Later, as the primary
agenda neared completion, Cramer began ushering his characteristic energy and spirit
into new projects.
Although there is little if anything in the congressional record in the way of overt
dissent from the Nixon administration, Cramer’s fighting spirit had obviously returned.
He openly regretted giving up his cherished role on the roads subcommittee, and he was
determined to make the most of his final year. As for the administration, the White
House apparently did not approve of Cramer’s scope of the challenges ahead. On May
14, while Gurney was launching his million-dollar fund-raising campaign, Cramer and
fourteen legislators introduced a bill to ensure that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970
would meet the nation’s changing demands. First on the agenda, as usual, was ensuring
that the interstate, which so far was 70 percent complete, received necessary funding.
Already, the remaining construction was expected to cost the government $13.7 billion
more than estimated in 1968. To accommodate inflation, Cramer called for $17.12
billion for 1972 to 1976.341
Cramer still considered the interstate system “the backbone of the entire highway
network of this country,” and he wanted to see the nation complete the system before
shifting “major attention to other highways.” However, with roughly 900,000 miles in
total Federal-Aid Highway Systems, the Interstate made up “only a small part” of
America’s highways. As soon as the Interstate System was completed, America had its
work cut out in bringing all other highways up to government standards.342
Cramer urged Congress to look far ahead and implement an “after 1975” highway
program, “so that necessary planning could be undertaken timely, and costly stops and
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starts avoided in the transition from the current highway program to the one that will
follow.” However, since Congress was not yet furnished with adequate, up-to-date
information to develop such a plan, Cramer called for the Transportation Department “to
develop, in cooperation with State highway departments and local governments, and to
report to Congress in January of 1972, . . . detailed recommendations for a continuing
Federal-aid highway program for the 15 year period from 1976 through 1990.” Until
then, Cramer proposed immediately channeling funds into primary and secondary
highways “for a spot improvement program to eliminate, on a priority basis, safety
hazards.” His bill also called for the federal funding of “training programs to provide
equal employment opportunities” during lulls in highway construction.343
The Congressman who had accomplished so much for federal expressways was
also now calling attention to the need to “promote the improvement and use of urban
highway public transportation systems.” He understood that mass transit would be a
difficult sell for most motorists, but figured that if “comfortable, convenient, attractive,
and safe buses operate over well-planned routes and on schedules that meet the needs of
the people, many persons in metropolitan areas who drive,” people might be convinced to
take the bus. In contrast to the period of interstate construction wherein the states had to
strain to conform to federal standards, Cramer believed that Federal-aid highway
programs should be “more flexible and adaptable to meet the needs of individual
communities,” recommending a combination of highways and mass transit systems.
However, not wanting to see money poorly spent, Cramer’s bill would allow for
alternative uses of highway funds only if the alternative system was at least as effective
as, and no more expensive than, a highway – a tall, perhaps even prohibitive, order.344
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On November 25, 1970, Cramer made his final Congressional speech on behalf of
highways. Here, Cramer mentioned that the long-range future highway programs he
introduced in April were the crux of his “break” with the Nixon Administration. In order
to “break new ground,” senior members of the Roads Subcommittee had learned that it
did not matter whether a Republican or a Democratic controlled the White House; this
special group would always have to push hard to make sure that America’s transportation
demands were met.345 Cramer ran the gamut of issues that the 1970 Federal-Aid
Highway Act needed to address. The alleviation of “urban congested areas” demanded a
“highway oriented mass transit program.” He also called for “an indepth study of the
problems relating to alcoholism” and safety measures on highway construction sites.346
Several members of the Roads Subcommittee were very close to Cramer and were
sad to see him leave. Their remarks suggest they held him in very high esteem. Don H.
Clausen, who played a prominent role in the shaping of the bill, credited Cramer as a
“champion of building a better America.” Congressman Kluczynski of Illinois,
Chairman of the Roads Subcommittee, described Cramer as “a brilliant, able lawyer, and
a very effective legislator.” Congressman Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma described
Cramer as “one of the hardest-working” and “one of the ablest debaters,” demonstrating
“mastery of detail,” “scholarship and workmanship in the preparation and finalizing of
the legislation that comes to the floor of the House.” Recalling past debates,
Congressman John A. Blatnik of Minnesota admired Cramer as “an antagonist as well as
a protagonist.” Out of their “combined conflict,” they “came out with good propositions .
. . that have been repeatedly sustained . . . by record-breaking majorities.” Cramer
reciprocated his appreciation for his fellow members on the Public Works Committee.347
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Yes We Can

On 9 March 1965, Governor Haydon Burns commemorated the completion of
Interstate 4. No interchange had been built where the highway intersected the Sunshine
Parkway, rest areas had yet to be built, and St. Petersburg cried out for an extension to the
Sunshine Skyway, but Interstate 4 was nevertheless ready for traffic.348 Though gaps still
existed as late as 1969, much of Interstate 75 from Michigan to Tampa was open to
traffic as early as 1965. After completing a 3.3-mile gap in Tampa, Florida would be the
first state to complete its share of the highway. Of course, construction of the Tampa to
Miami route pushed back I-75’s overall completion date.349
By May 1971, Interstate 75 from the Howard Frankland Bridge to St. Petersburg’s
9th Street had been completed while work commenced on an overpass over Gandy
Boulevard.350 However, the environmental movement was beginning to complicate
matters for the rest of I-75. In 1968, officials thought that construction could begin as
early as 1970, but by 1971, the Florida Department of Transportation was compelled to
develop environmental plans for 32 federal agencies. Millions of dollars worth of plans
had to be reassessed for environmental impact. Handing existing plans to the Turnpike
Authority to avoid federal regulations was still a possibility, but at last in 1973 the
missing link received environmental approval. Meanwhile, successive presidential
administrations threatened to cut highway budgets, and the mid-1970s fuel crisis undercut
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gasoline tax revenues. According to state officials, I-75 would not be completed until, at
best, 1980.351 By 1975, surprisingly little progress had been made. Due to funding
problems, one pessimistic prediction placed the completion date as late as 2009.352 In
1978, bridges across the Manatee River and the Peace River were under construction,
along with other segments of Interstate 75 from Tampa Bay to Naples.353 Piece by piece,
the missing link reached completion in the 1980s.
The impact of Florida’s expressways was immediate and widespread. In I-4’s first
year, 40,000 cars passed by downtown Orlando each day, and eventually Central Florida
became “among the most sprawling places in America.”354 Interstate 75, said the St.
Petersburg Times, created a “revolution in Florida’s economy.” At the intersection of I75 and I-10, a 100-unit hotel went up in Lake City, a city self-described as the “New
Gateway to Florida.” Likewise, Wildwood dubbed itself the “Gateway to South Florida.”
New businesses established themselves along Gainesville’s three I-75 exits, and the
highway became the “spine” of the city’s development. Meanwhile, businesses along old
highways such as US 41, US 27, and US 301 struggled to adapt to the circumstances,
with service stations switching to local car maintenance and motels enticing tourists to
stay for longer periods of time. Many businesses simply folded.355 Along US 1, old
shopping centers devolved into “oversized neighborhood centers with identity crises,”
whose owners found it difficult to retain tenants.356
The environmental impact of the superhighways was incredible. Opponents
fought the routing of every highway, often to no avail. In Manatee County, the Izaak
Walton League fought unsuccessfully to save a cypress stand in the path of I-75.357 A
Governor’s Task Force under Reubin Askew listened to appeals to save the western edge
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of the Loxahatachee Slough along I-95.358 Near Tequesta, residents registered a 281-acre
bird sanctuary with the Florida Audubon Society to save the land from I-95.359
Oftentimes, engineers had to choose between building through undeveloped
environments or through residential areas. Many homes were lost, and countless others,
many of them built in formerly pleasant neighborhoods, had to deal with the noise and
unsightliness of superhighways. With every routing and rerouting, there were winners,
losers, and uncertainty.
Like other baby boomers, in the 2000s, the superhighways conceived and brought
into being during the 1950s have been reaching their fiftieth anniversary. Retrospective
articles described how interstates have “remade the country’s social and economic
landscape,” some believe for the worse. In contrast to traditional two-lane highways, the
superhighways have been deemed “soulless” and “tedious.” In exchange for roadside
regional character, the nation acquired fast food chains.360 Interstates have become
synonymous with divided cities, oil dependence, rampant sprawl, pollution, and
environmental degradation. Meanwhile, the demand for new highways has outpaced the
nation’s road building capacity, and the average driver spends about 38 hours per year
stuck in traffic.361 In Florida, as in many other parts of the country, chronic traffic jams
characterize many stretches of highway. Central Florida’s I-4 boasted the nation’s ninth
worst traffic congestion in 2006, where the smell of orange blossoms has been supplanted
by “the smell of idling engines,” and the perpetual existence of detours and closed lanes
due to road improvements have “tried the patience of even the most forgiving
commuters.”362 Many other expressway segments have become notorious. The site of
numerous fatal accidents with mysterious causes, I-75 from Alachua to Ocala became
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known as “a sort of Bermuda Triangle.”363
While federal expressways have been maintained, widened, and improved, their
dependence on unpopular revenues such as gasoline taxes did not allow them to grow
quite like the toll highway system now known as Florida’s Turnpike. In the 1980s, after
paying off the bonds to the original turnpike, the legislature voted in 1990 to widen the
original parkway and build new highways with the surplus toll revenue. Since then, the
Turnpike took over of the failing Sawgrass Expressway in Broward County, then
financed construction of another 150 miles of urban expressways in the Tampa Bay,
Orlando, and Lakeland areas. With a total of 460 miles of highway, 2.1 million vehicles
drove on Florida’s tollways in 2006, generating $643 million.364 Metropolitan areas
continue to rely primarily on tolls to finance new expressway projects.
In 2006, the Turnpike received what may be the most controversial highway
proposal in the state’s history, a $7 billion, 152-mile expressway pushing through an
undeveloped interior strip of Florida. The Heartland Parkway began as a project of the
Heartland Economic, Agricultural and Rural Task Force, or HEART. Created in 2005,
HEART’s membership included Lykes Brothers, Collier Enterprises, and State Senator
J.D. Alexander of Lake Wales, in short, of “a pedigree of Florida’s landed elite,” with
each member owning significant tracts of land in the Parkway’s path. Editorialist Howard
Troxler drew a satirical map of the proposed highway, which included exits to the Tampa
Bay Sprawlway, Sprawladelphia, and Sustainablemixeduseburg, while zigzagging and
swirling through the properties of its backers. Before leaving office, Governor Bush’s
Secretary of Transportation Denver Stutler submitted an “action plan” which included the
Heartland Parkway, but Governor Charlie Crist’s administration has opposed the
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Parkway along with the entire “Future Corridors” program, composed of nine new
expressways covering more than one thousand miles throughout the state. Crist later
described the Parkway as a “road to nowhere,” and said that when appointing
Transportation Secretary Stephanie Kopelousos, he sought someone who would improve
existing expressways in South Florida, particularly I-95, I-75, and I-4, rather than blaze
new trails through undeveloped areas. HEART attorney Rick Dantzler has argued that the
Parkway could be used to “organize” Florida’s inevitable growth, but Department of
Community Affairs Secretary Thomas Pelham disagreed with Parkway proponents,
arguing that their highway proposal “should not be driving land-use planning,” but that a
comprehensive land planning should “determine the appropriate transportation.”365
The Urban Land Institute has named west-central Florida one of the United
States’ eight emerging “super cities.” Ignoring the laments of those who believe Florida
already has enough people, metropolitan planners continue to look for ways to
accommodate yet more growth. In 2007, the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council gave
experts a pile of Lego blocks and a map with the goal of finding ways to accommodate
3.2 million additional residents by 2050. The Planning Council ignored county lines,
seeking regionwide transportation plans and possibly a rail system.366
While comprehensive planning in the Tampa Bay area poses challenges,
coordinating municipal and county governments can be next to impossible. For example,
Senator Alexander has resisted efforts to bring Polk County into Tampa Bay’s planning
process, claiming, “The interests of Tampa Bay are different … than the interests of Polk
County,” whose destiny he saw tied to inland counties where the Heartland Parkway
would run.367 Polk was not the only county to resist incorporating certain Tampa Bay
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transportation developments. In 2007, Hillsborough County completed a $2.2 million
highway to the Pasco County line to ease traffic on Bruce B. Downs Boulevard, but
Pasco balked on a promise to connect to the road, and so it dead-ended just before
reaching Kinnan Street. Assistant County Administrator Bipin Parikh explained he did
not want other streets to become overburdened, like Pasco’s Cross Creek Boulevard.368
In the future, how will regional transportation planners gather official consensus? And
what will they do if they cannot?
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At the end of his last term in Congress, Cramer remarked, “If we do not ship the
goods in America, if we do not accommodate the moving people in America, America
will be stymied and will be stultified, and it will die.”369 What shape will future
transportation systems take? In past decades, with an abundance of fossil fuels, highways
have provided an essential source of freedom. With rising fuel costs and an uncertain
economy, will cars and highways continue to offer freedom, or will they prove an
unsustainable form of transportation?
As I write, an election cycle has come to an end. Barack Obama will be the next
President, and the Democratic Party has increased its majorities in the House and Senate.
Great challenges lie ahead as the nation faces “two wars, a planet in peril, the worst
financial crisis in a century,” but in his first speech as President-elect, Obama has infused
the nation with a simple mantra. “Yes, we can.”370 It may be that there has never been a
better opportunity for Americans of all stripes to let go of past prejudices, to come
together and dream, to let everyone’s voice be heard, to nurture democracy, to create a
more exceptional nation, and to extend and sustain peace and prosperity around the
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world. Yes, I daresay, we are.
In this world of possibility, it is difficult to know what we should hope for? In
Florida, a series of ambitious transit proposals have repeatedly been sidetracked. The
prevalence of low-density sprawl has made the establishment of profitable, effective
transit routes virtually impossible, and rail systems linking Tampa Bay, Orlando, and
Miami have been derailed. Despite worsening traffic conditions, it is still more convenient
for most people to drive cars than ride buses. Compared to riding a bike or a bus, cars
enable people to go more places faster and to bring more stuff with them. For several
years, I have managed to get by with a bicycle as my primary means of transportation.
Living in downtown St. Petersburg, this has been made possible by the fact that home,
school, work, friends, and other necessities such as food are all in close proximity.
However, it is hard to imagine trying to survive anywhere else in the Tampa Bay area
without a car. Despite St. Petersburg’s cycling possibilities, cars still rule the streets.
Despite decades of setbacks, now is the time to think big. In Florida, virtually
everyone agrees that the transportation systems need revamped, but there is a great divide
on what path to take. Metropolitan areas are likely to welcome regional planning, mass
transit, and federal funding. Meanwhile, against the will of many of their constituents,
representatives of outlying areas such as Polk County may unfortunately cling to
traditional, non-constructive highway planning concepts. The temptation is still strong
for powerful landholders to coordinate highways through their properties, collect tolls,
and increase their fortunes. In the 1950s, this may have seemed a reasonable approach,
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but since then, Floridians have learned the importance of reigning in development and
preserving wilderness areas. Low-density sprawl is the direct consequence of
unrestrained highway initiatives. To prevent this outcome, conscientious Floridians
should be prepared for an arduous battle, especially if Governor Crist’s successor
embraces an ambitious highway program.
Unless we wish to court disaster, future transportation systems must be very
different from the expressway networks of yesteryear. Setting into motion a plan for
responsibly addressing the nation’s transportation needs, Obama has acknowledged that
highways alone will not serve the needs of today. New highways encourage urban sprawl
and heighten dependence on personal automobiles, increasing fuel consumption and
making it difficult for people who cannot afford vehicles to get to work. As states
develop transportation systems, mass transit will be an absolute necessity as fuel
conservation will be a required element for federal funding. Tax incentives must be
created for those who walk, bike, or ride a bus rather than drive a car. Already, the Obama
campaign has stated the intent of creating “a robust federal infrastructure investment
program” for future transportation systems. As a financial supplement, a new National
Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank is slated to provide $60 billion over ten years for
transportation projects.371
A surprising, unanticipated outcome of this study of expressway development is
that it has yielded a model for understanding problems that may be encountered in future
developments, and for assessing whether their execution will run smoothly. In fact, the
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situation today is not all that different from that of the 1950s. In common with mid-20th
century expressway construction, Obama has stated that his initiatives will create more
than a million jobs, thus offsetting the current slump in construction work and refueling
the economy.372 As in the 1960s, measures should be put in place to ensure that funding
remains ample and consistent from year to year, leveling the peaks and valleys frequently
encountered in the construction industry.
Just as there will be federal initiatives, city, county, and state governments will also
have proposals, along with private organizations. As in the past, there will undoubtedly
be conflicts. With the help of elected officials, appointees, government workers, and the
media, the public will play a crucial role in deciding what proposals work best. As I have
tried to demonstrate, William C. Cramer exemplifies how representatives can use their
authority to bring integrity to transportation programs in Florida and throughout the
nation. He took his job very seriously. He had a brilliant understanding of how to make
transportation bills work according to design, in the best interests of the public, often
against the wishes of state leaders with less egalitarian aims. His party never won a
majority in the House during his tenure, but through keen, diligent service, Cramer was
able to accomplish a great deal. He demonstrates how minority Republicans today can
play a lead role while healing the partisan divide, and his example may serve as a beacon
for all transportation planners.
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